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interpretation of the doctrine that accommodates both the rhetoric of good faith and fair 
dealing and the reality of judicial enforcement. Good faith and fair dealing, the article 
contends, is an underenforced legal norm. The duty is valid as a legal norm to the fullest 
extent, even though courts engage only in partial enforcement of that norm. This article is the 
first to bring the idea of underenforced legal norms into private law, drawing on the extensive 
literature on underenforced legal norms in constitutional law, and on analogous ideas in 
corporate law. The article explores the reasons why legislatures and courts might want to 
announce a duty whose scope extends beyond what the courts enforce. In private law, as 
elsewhere, the underenforcement idea allows courts to lend their expressive support to the 
broader norm while avoiding the negative side effects that attempted full enforcement would 
entail.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Most contract litigation requires courts to give meaning to contracts using 
doctrines of interpretation and implied terms. The most ambitious of these 
doctrines is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. According to the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, every contract imposes on each party a duty 
of good faith and fair dealing in the contract’s performance and enforcement,1 and 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing is well established in most American 
jurisdictions. Though few doubt its significance,2 the duty’s meaning is notoriously 
unclear. Good faith is ‘an intangible and abstract quality with no technical 
meaning’;3 its fellow traveler, ‘fair dealing’, is no more precise. Determining the 
scope of such ‘nebulous’ standards has caused courts ‘intractable difficulty’.4 
Exasperation with the case law on good faith and fair dealing is commonplace 
among contracts scholars, who have confessedly had ‘very little success in agreeing 
on standards that might give a court guidance’.5  
This article aims to make sense of good faith and fair dealing by showing that 
it is an underenforced legal norm. Let me explain. Much of the difficulty with 
good faith and fair dealing involves a mismatch between, on one hand, what 
legislatures and judges say and, on the other hand, what judges do. At first glance, 
the doctrine seems to demand that parties adhere to lofty standards of contractual 
conduct: the Restatement states that the duty involves ‘faithfulness to an agreed 
common purpose’ and ‘consistency with the justified expectations of the other 
party’.6 The U.C.C.’s general definition of good faith encompasses both ‘honesty 
in fact’ and ‘the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing’.7 
The duty, one court recently said, is breached when a party ‘exercises discretion 
authorized in a contract in an unreasonable way’.8 These ways of expressing the 
duty seem to give judges and juries a powerful role in pronouncing on the 
appropriateness of the parties’ post-formation conduct, regardless of whether the 
contract’s text explicitly forbids the defendant’s action.  
But in the real world of litigation, the application of good faith and fair 
dealing has generally fallen short of these demanding ideals. The case law is replete 
with judges expressing the need for caution,9 and courts have devised various 
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
2 Robert S. Summers, Good Faith Revisited, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 723, 726 (2009) (‘I believe there is no 
obligation in all of the U.C.C. and in general contract law of more overall importance than the general 
obligation of good faith’). 
3 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed. 1990). 
4 Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619, 621 (1981).  
5 James J. White, Good Faith and the Cooperative Antagonist, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 679, 679 (2001). 
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a. 
7 U.C.C. § 1-201(20). The definition of good faith under the Code has evolved over the years, as 
explained in Part I.A. below. 
8 Montanez v. HSBC Mortg. Corp. (USA), 876 F. Supp. 2d 504, 513 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
9 See, e.g., Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1998) 
(‘implying obligations based on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a cautious enterprise’).  
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restrictive doctrinal tests that make it difficult to establish a breach of the duty.10 
When evaluating the defendant’s performance, courts sometimes use deferential 
standards of review, akin to corporate law’s business judgment rule.11 In addition, 
courts often require plaintiffs to establish a bad motive, trickery12 or some other 
form of particularly egregious conduct by the defendant.13 Another way that 
courts make it difficult to invoke the duty is to place challenging evidentiary 
burdens upon those claiming breaches.14 Further, in some contexts, particularly 
suits challenging terminations of employment, many courts effectively refuse to 
apply the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing.15 And some judges are hostile to 
any doctrine that allows the implication of terms beyond the contract’s express 
text.16  
In response to this clear divergence between the rhetoric of good faith and 
the reality of judicial enforcement, scholars have articulated two main ways of 
closing the gap. Advocates of literalism in the interpretation and construction of 
contracts contend that courts should ‘level down’ the rhetoric of good faith to 
match the reality of their enforcement practices.17 Some go so far as to say that the 
American courts should abandon their decades-long experiment with the doctrine 
of good faith performance.18 Supporters of a more extensive judicial role take the 
opposite approach. In the face of weak enforcement practices, they contend that 
courts should ‘level up’ those practices to bring them into line with expansive 
conceptions of fairness.19  
Contending that the duty can usefully be understood as an underenforced 
legal norm, this article offers a way to reconcile rhetoric and judicial enforcement 
in good faith and fair dealing.  The duty is valid as a legal norm to the fullest 
10 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Implied Obligation of Good Faith in Contract Law: Is it Time to Write its 
Obituary?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 21 (2009) (‘most courts balk at giving the obligation real substantive 
force and effect’).  
11 E.g., Svela v. Union Oil Co. of California, 807 F.2d 1494, 1501 (9th Cir. 1987) (refusing to engage in 
‘judicial second-guessing of the economic decisions of franchisors’). 
12 E.g., Market Street Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.).  
13 E.g., Unishippers Global Logistics, LLC v. DHL Exp. (USA), Inc., No. 11-4216, 2013 WL 2398761 
(10th Cir. June 4, 2013) (freight service company’s conduct in terminating a long-term services agreement 
‘[did] not rise to the level of action so egregious as to constitute a breach of good faith’ under Utah law). 
14 E.g., Am-Pro Prot. Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (plaintiffs suing the 
federal government for breach of the implied covenant must provide clear and convincing evidence of 
bad faith). 
15 E.g., Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841 (Kan. 1987) (‘the principle of law stated in Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 205 […] is overly broad and should not be applicable to employment-at-will 
contracts.’). 
16 E.g., Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(Easterbrook, J.). 
17 E.g., Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 
280 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.).  
18 E.g., Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract Interpretation and Gap-Filling: Reviling a 
Revered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 559 (2006). 
19 See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Article 2 and Relational Sale Contracts, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 789, 797 (1993) 
(courts should find bad faith where ‘one party’s conduct deviates from internal norms generated by the 
relationship’); Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of 
Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025 (2003) (arguing for judicial enforcement of 
expansive notion of equality via the good faith doctrine). 
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extent, requiring parties to treat each other reasonably when exercising contractual 
discretion. But the rules of decision applied by the courts when adjudicating 
disputes over good faith and fair dealing involve only partial enforcement of the 
norm’s demands. Judicial decision rules draw their inspiration from the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing, but courts, due to their limited competence, do not 
attempt to exhaust the duty’s content. Underenforcement is particularly likely to 
make sense where other mechanisms for checking unreasonable contractual 
conduct — especially self-help and reputational sanctions — are available and 
likely to be effective.  Though courts may have overreacted to the difficulties of 
adjudicating breaches of good faith and fair dealing, I contend that some degree of 
underenforcement of the norm is sensible.  
Contrary to the assumption common to the leveling-up and leaving-down 
strategies,20 then, I contend that legal obligation in the law of contracts can exist in 
a particular instance even though the legal system will not attach a sanction to 
some instances of its breach. To explain how this can be so, I adopt Meir Dan-
Cohen’s distinction between conduct rules and decision rules.21 Like any other 
legal rule, the law of good faith and fair dealing can be understood both as a rule 
of conduct directed at the parties (a conduct rule) and as a set of rules directed at 
courts tasked with enforcing the norm (decision rules). Though we generally 
expect conduct rules and decision rules to align, my suggested way forward allows 
them to diverge in the good faith and fair dealing context: the conduct rule 
extends to behavior not covered by the decision rules.  
Though mostly absent from private law scholarship,22 the notion of 
underenforced legal norms is established in other areas of the law. The idea is 
particularly well known in constitutional law, where scholars have long argued that 
it is justifiable for gaps to open up between the meaning of the Constitution and 
the doctrines the courts devise for its enforcement.23 Justiciability doctrines like 
the political question doctrine provide the most obvious instances of the courts 
holding their fire. More subtly, the doctrines the courts have devised for 
adjudicating equal protection cases — particularly the rule of rational basis review 
that governs ordinary cases — fall short of full enforcement. Courts refrain from 
full enforcement of constitutional norms because of the special limitations and 
pitfalls of judicial action. Similar ideas are at work in a recent vein of corporate law 
scholarship. In that field, scholars have noted a disparity between standards of 
20 For an explicit statement of this generally held assumption, see Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: 
Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1783 (2008) (assuming, for the sake of argument, 
that ‘a contractual obligation might exist without any sanction attached to breach’, but claiming ‘that is 
not the contract law we have’.). 
21 Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 625 (1984). 
22 One exception is Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right To Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and 
Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593 (2008) (distinguishing between conduct rules and 
decision rules in property law). 
23 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 
1278–79 (2006) [hereinafter Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards]. 
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conduct and standards of review in the law of directors’ and officers’ duties.24 
Without making the link with constitutional law, one writer has recently argued 
that directors’ and officers’ duties are underenforced and that partial 
underenforcement is a justifiable response to the institutional limitations of courts 
and judicial sanctions.25 
In the same way that a constitutional norm or a rule of corporate law can be 
valid and binding on government actors or corporate office-holders even though 
the courts will not always award a remedy for its violation,26 the norm of good 
faith and fair dealing binds parties even though they face no risk of legal sanction 
for certain kinds of breach. The insight that good faith and fair dealing is an 
underenforced legal norm provides both an explanation for the current state of 
the doctrine and the beginnings of a suggested way forward. In brief, we should 
abandon the search for a single, crisp definition of good faith and fair dealing that 
courts can apply in every case. Instead, we should be moving towards a series of 
sub-doctrines applicable to different contexts. Because the relative effectiveness of 
courts and non-judicial sanctions varies greatly in different contexts, we should 
not be surprised that the courts have been more receptive to good faith claims in 
some areas than in others. This kind of doctrinal elaboration would not provide a 
replacement for the norm of good faith and fair dealing, any more than ‘tiers of 
scrutiny’ in constitutional law replace the constitutional norm of equal protection. 
Rather, we should be seeking a set of judicially manageable standards inspired by the 
norm of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of contracts.  
The article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I explain the development of the 
good faith and fair dealing norm in American contract law, emphasizing the gap 
between the rhetoric of good faith and fair dealing and the reality of judicial 
practice. In Part II, I explain the notion of underenforced norms in constitutional 
law, focusing particularly on the example of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause. I also canvass the literature on the divergence between 
standards of conduct and standards of review in corporate law. Armed with 
insights from the constitutional and corporate law, I return in Part III to good 
faith and fair dealing in contracts. The parallels between these contexts are, I 
claim, illuminating in several ways. I explore the reasons why courts or legislators 
would deliberately choose to announce a broad norm of good faith and fair 
dealing while eschewing full judicial enforcement. In Part IV, I examine the 
normative implications of the insight, making a series of doctrinal proposals. 
  
 
 
24 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Divergence]. 
25 Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 519 (2012).  
26 See Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 1212 (1978). 
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I. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING: RHETORIC AND REALITY 
 
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is a tool that helps courts discern the 
meaning of, or to fill gaps in,27 contracts that the parties have already concluded.28 
Contracts are notoriously incomplete.29 Lacking infinite foresight and endless time 
to clarify their potential future entitlements and responsibilities, contracting parties 
do not provide specifically for every contingency that might arise during the 
course of performance. By accident or by design, then, contracts give parties 
discretion in the ways that they perform and enforce their mutual obligations. In 
turn, this discretion creates a risk that it will be exercised in a purely self-interested 
or opportunistic way. But the courts are not powerless to police exercises of post-
contractual discretion. Various interpretive or gap-filling doctrines allow the courts 
to imply terms restraining some kinds of self-interested behavior, even if the 
parties have not explicitly written such constraints into their contracts. Perhaps the 
most important of these doctrines is the implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
Below, I chart the divergence between the expansive terms in which most 
legislatures and courts have defined the duty of good faith and fair dealing (Part A) 
and the limited extent to which courts have actually enforced the duty (Part B), a 
divergence that has already been noted by other scholars. I then explain two 
common strategies for closing the gap between the rhetoric of good faith 
performance and its actual enforcement: what I call the the ‘leveling-down’ 
strategy, and the less popular ‘leveling-up’ strategy (Part C).  
27  I sidestep the intricate debate over whether good faith and fair dealing is, on one hand, a doctrine of 
interpretation, or, on the other hand, is an invitation for judges to fill gaps in incomplete contracts how 
they see fit. My arguments are intended to be compatible with both views. For a recent defense of the 
view that good faith and fair dealing holds the parties to the correct interpretation of their own 
agreement, see Daniel Markovits, Good Faith as Contract’s Core Value, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONTRACT LAW (G. Klass, P. Saprai, and G. Letsas eds., forthcoming 2014). For the gap-filling view, see, 
for example, Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828 (Ct. App. 1986) (‘the obligations stemming 
from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are imposed by law as normative values of 
society.’). 
28 American courts do not apply the duty to the precontractual phase, though they will generally enforce 
an express precontractual agreement to negotiate in good faith. See, e.g., SIGA Technologies, Inc. v. 
PharmAthene, Inc., 314, 2012, 2013 WL 2303303 (Del. May 24, 2013) (reaffirming that an explicit 
agreement to negotiate in good faith is enforceable under Delaware law). In some jurisdictions, courts are 
willing to find implied agreements to negotiate in good faith once the parties have agreed on major terms 
but have left other terms open. See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 
491 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (New York law); see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and 
Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 664 n.7 (2007) (‘thirteen states, sixteen federal district 
courts, and seven federal circuits’ follow the Tribune approach). Even in the absence of an express or 
implied agreement to negotiate in good faith, American courts sometimes police bad faith conduct using 
other doctrines, including promissory estoppel. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267 
(Wis. 1965). 
29 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1641 
(2003) (‘All contracts are incomplete. There are infinite states of the world and the capacities of 
contracting parties to condition their future performance on each possible state are finite.’). 
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A. THE DEFINITIONAL TRIUMPH OF COMMERCIAL REASONABLENESS 
 
For centuries, the common law generally took a cautious approach to the idea of 
good faith in contracts, despite Lord Mansfield’s claim in the 1770s that good faith 
is the basis of all contracts and dealings.30 Until the twentieth century, the notion 
of good faith appeared most prominently in disputes over title to property and 
negotiable instruments, where it continues to play a crucial role in the doctrine of 
good faith purchase. In these cases, good faith was, and is, essentially a state of 
mind — innocence, or lack of notice.31 Because courts generally refrained from 
assessing the reasonableness or diligence of a purchaser’s inquiries, good faith was 
sometimes known as the rule of the ‘pure heart and an empty head’.32 The distinct 
notion of good faith as a source of duties to one’s contractual counterparty was 
limited in the nineteenth century to fiduciary relations and to certain insurance 
contracts.33  
New York appears to have been the first American jurisdiction to embrace 
good faith performance as a general doctrine.34 In the 1933 case of Kirk La Shelle 
Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co.,35 the defendants settled a copyright lawsuit with the 
plaintiff by agreeing to pay the plaintiff half of the receipts from the revival of a 
play. The agreement gave the plaintiff approval rights over all arrangements, 
except the motion picture rights. At the time of the agreement, all motion pictures 
were silent. After the advent of talking motion pictures, the defendants sold all the 
motion picture rights without seeking the plaintiff’s approval. This course of 
action was seemingly permitted by the words of the agreement, but the New York 
Court of Appeals nevertheless ruled that it was a breach of contract. The court 
stated that the defendants had ‘assumed a fiduciary relationship which had its 
origin in the contract’.36 In fact, the court stressed that there was nothing special 
about this particular contract; rather,  
 
in every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do 
anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the 
30 Carter v. Boehm, [1766] 97 Eng. Rep. 1162, 1164 (K.B. 1766); Boone v. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 273, 126 Eng. 
Rep. 150 (K.B. 1777). 
31 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 668 (1963). 
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. b (1981).  
33 See McLanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 170 (1828). 
34 By contrast, civil law countries allowed good faith a more general role. Section 242 of the German Civil 
Code, which came into force in 1900, provides that ‘a person subject to an obligation under the Code is 
obligated to perform in such a manner as good faith (Treu und Glauben) requires, taking into account 
general practice.’ The German courts have used the idea of good faith for a variety of creative purposes, 
including imposing precontractual liability, protecting third parties, and, most famously, revising price 
terms in the wake of the hyperinflation crisis of the 1920s. For an overview, see Werner Ebke and Bettina 
Steinhauer, The Doctrine of Good Faith in German Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT 
LAW (J. Beatson and D. Friedmann, eds., 1995); see also JOHN P. DAWSON, ORACLES OF THE LAW 461–79 
(1968). 
35 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933).  
36 Id. 
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other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every 
contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.’37 
 
Over the next twenty-five years, several other jurisdictions adopted a general duty 
of good faith and fair dealing, in terms broadly similar to New York’s.38  
The adoption of the U.C.C. provided a major leap forward for good faith in 
American contract law. The U.C.C. itself provides that ‘[e]very contract or duty 
within [the Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or 
enforcement’.39 In addition to the general requirement, the Code requires parties 
to observe a good faith standard in more than sixty specific provisions.40 Karl 
Llewellyn, the Chief Reporter and principal architect of the U.C.C., was primarily 
responsible for the Code’s adoption of a general obligation of good faith.41 He 
proposed a general obligation of good faith in the initial 1949 draft of the Code. 
The obligation of good faith was a crucial part of Llewellyn’s more general project 
of reforming the classical law of contract to bring it into line with commercial 
morality, with the aim of ensuring that commercial law would be flexible enough 
to keep pace with changes in commercial practice.42  
Llewellyn also proposed his own definition of good faith under the Code. 
Debates over how to define the term in good faith purchase law had long focused 
on whether good faith depended solely on the relevant party’s actual state of mind 
(a ‘subjective’ standard) or turned instead on whether the party had complied with 
standards of reasonable behavior (an ‘objective’ standard). In keeping with 
Llewellyn’s expansive vision for commercial law, his initial proposed definition of 
good faith in the Code was broad, encompassing both ‘honesty in fact in the 
conduct or transaction concerned’ and ‘observance by a person of the reasonable 
standards of any business or trade in which he is engaged’.43 But, at least initially, 
Llewellyn did not entirely get his own way when it came to the definition of good 
faith. His inclusion of a reasonableness requirement in the draft Code drew 
criticism from some practicing lawyers involved in the U.C.C. project, who 
37 Id. at 167 (emphasis added). For a similar, earlier statement, see Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 
622, 624 (N.Y. 1914).  
38 See, e.g., Salem King’s Products Co. v. Ramp, 196 P. 401, 409 (Or. 1921); Clark v. State St. Trust Co., 
169 N.E. 897, 903 (Mass. 1930); World’s Exposition Shows v. B.P.O. Elks, 186 So. 721, 723 (Ala. 1939); 
Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 128 P.2d 665, 677 (Cal. 1942); Martindell v. Lake 
Shore Nat. Bank, 154 N.E.2d 683, 690 (Ill. 1958).  
39 U.C.C. § 1-304.  
40 See Robert S. Summers, ‘Good Faith’ in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 195 n.2 (1968). (1968). 
41 Llewellyn drew both on existing American precedents and on German law. See supra note 34; see also 
James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn’s German Sources for the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156, 163 (1987) (noting the affinity between Llewellyn’s vision of 
commercial law and the views of some nineteenth-century German legal scholars). 
42 In addition to the good faith provisions, Llewellyn was behind the Code’s adoption of a lax parol 
evidence rule, and also the Code’s directions to courts to consider usages of trade, courses of 
performance, and courses of dealing in contract adjudication. 
43 U.C.C. § 1-201(18) (May 1949 draft).  
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objected to the legalization of commercial morality, and voiced fears that 
customers would be encouraged to bring unjustified suits for supposed failures to 
comply with reasonable standards of behavior.44 The ABA Section of 
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law thus urged a narrower definition of good 
faith, limited to honesty in fact and ‘the absence of trickery, deceit, or improper 
purpose’.45 
The U.C.C.’s drafters adopted a compromise. They agreed that the Code’s 
overarching obligation of good faith in the performance and enforcement of 
commercial obligations should be restricted to ‘honesty in fact’. But in Article 2, 
which governs sales of goods, the drafters applied Llewellyn’s broader view of 
good faith to cases where the party performing or enforcing an obligation was a 
merchant, requiring merchants to observe ‘reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing’. This compromise was ultimately incorporated into the first version of 
the Code’s Official Text, approved in 1962.46 And even the seemingly narrower 
term ‘honesty in fact’ was subject to broad readings by the Code’s proponents. 
Commending the Code to New York’s legislators, Edwin Patterson contended 
that ‘honesty in fact’ encompassed requirements of ‘generosity’, ‘co-operation’, 
and that it would mitigate the effects of ‘hard luck’ in commerce.47 
In this form, good faith became a major part of commercial law in the 
jurisdictions adopting the U.C.C. — all of the states and the District of 
Columbia48 — and the idea soon spread far beyond the Code. Robert Summers’ 
1968 article on good faith was an important step along the way to the widespread 
adoption of a general obligation in American contract law.49 Using an idea 
borrowed from the philosophy of language,50 Summers claimed that good faith 
was an ‘excluder’ — it served to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of 
bad faith.51 Summers’ own nonexhaustive list of categories of bad faith 
performance included: (1) evasion of the spirit of the deal, (2) lack of diligence and 
slacking off, (3) willfully rendering only substantial performance, (4) abuse of a 
power to specify terms, (5) abuse of a power to determine compliance, and (6) 
interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance. In 
44 Walter D. Malcolm et al., Report of Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code, 6 BUS. LAW. 119, 127 (1951) 
(‘Why should the Code draftsmen tell us to be good? Businessmen, or at least most of them, carry on 
business ethically and did so long before the Code was ever conceived. The Code should not try to 
prescribe morals.’). 
45 Id. at 128. 
46 U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19) & 2-103(1)(b) (1962). 
47 1 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 310–15 
(1955). 
48 And Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. Louisiana has not adopted Article 2 of the U.C.C., 
though it has adopted Article 1 and several other Articles. 
49 Summers, supra note 40. 
50 See J.L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 70–71 (1962); see also Roland Hall, Excluders, 20 ANALYSIS 1 
(1959); cf. Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and Enforcement 
Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 349 (1988) (criticizing Summers’ application of the 
philosophical concept of excluders). 
51 Summers, supra note 40, at 201. 
 9 
                                                     
                         22/2014 
 
Summers’ view, the U.C.C.’s general definition as ‘honesty in fact’ was plainly too 
narrow, for there are several categories of non-dishonest bad faith.52  
In turn, Summers’ conception of good faith influenced Robert Braucher, who 
drafted section 205 of the Restatement (Second).53 That provision states that 
‘[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in 
its performance and its enforcement.’ By using both of the U.C.C.’s terms — 
‘good faith’ and ‘fair dealing’ — the Restatement made clear that the duty extended 
beyond an honesty requirement. According to the comments to section 205, in the 
particular context of contract performance and enforcement, good faith 
‘emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the 
justified expectations of the other party.’54 Adopting the ‘excluder’ analysis, the 
comments continue by saying that good faith ‘excludes a variety of types of 
conduct characterized as involving ‘bad faith’ because they violate community 
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.’55 Again echoing Summers, the 
comments state that ‘[a] complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible,’ 
and recite Summers’ list of types of bad faith conduct as illustrations.  
The vast majority of American jurisdictions have adopted the duty as a matter 
of general contract law; many have explicitly endorsed the Restatement 
approach.56 State and federal statutes governing particular classes of contracts 
contain similar requirements.57 Moreover, over time, various amendments to the 
U.C.C. extended the ‘objective’ standard of commercial reasonableness to various 
contexts beyond Article 2.58 Eventually, the Code’s definition of good faith 
flipped, so that commercial reasonableness now constitutes the general rule. Since 
2003, the Official Text of the U.C.C. now essentially reinstates Llewellyn’s 
definition of good faith, defining the term as ‘honesty in fact and the observance 
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing’.59 Though some states 
continue to limit the general definition of good faith in their version of U.C.C. to 
‘honesty in fact’, most jurisdictions now adopt the broader view as a general 
matter.60  
52 Id. at 204. 
53 See Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing — Its Recognition and 
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982). 
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981). 
55 Id. 
56 See, e.g., Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc., 811 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Wis. App. 2012) (‘The rule that parties 
to a contract act in good faith is universal.’).  
57 See, e.g., Automobile Dealer’s Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (providing automobile franchisee with 
a cause of action against an automobile manufacturer who fails to ‘act in good faith in performing or 
complying with any of the terms or provisions of the franchise’); Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(D) (franchisor terminating franchise arrangement for reason other than franchisee 
misconduct must do so ‘in good faith and the normal course of business’).  
58 For example, Article 2A of the U.C.C., which governs leases of goods, applied the broader standard to 
merchants from its inception.  
59 U.C.C. 1-201(20). The Code continues to exempt Article 5, which governs letters of credit, from the 
commercial reasonableness standard.  
60 See 6-26 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 26.8 (as of August 1, 2010, 39 states had adopted the revised U.C.C.; 
28 of those adopt the broader general definition of good faith). 
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For the most part, then, the American law of good faith provides that those 
performing and enforcing contractual obligations must observe standards of ‘fair 
dealing’ or ‘commercial reasonableness’. As envisaged by influential contracts 
scholars like Llewellyn and Summers, the good faith duty requires substantial 
deference to the other party’s interests, beyond what the terms of the formal 
document demand. Courts have used a variety of formulations to reflect the 
understanding that good faith and fair dealing involves the incorporation into law 
of ‘contractual morality’,61 opening up the potential for extensive judicial 
superintendence of contractual discretion. As scholars in a long tradition of work 
on the relational aspects of contract have shown, the morality of contracting — as 
perceived by the participants — pervasively demands cooperation, flexibility, and 
some degree of accommodation of the other party’s legitimate interests.62 Along 
similar lines, many courts have cited the Summers-Restatement reference to 
community standards of decency, fairness, and reasonableness as an interpretation 
of the meaning of good faith and fair dealing.63 Others say that the duty prevents 
parties from frustrating the purpose of the contract.64 Some courts have spoken of 
a ‘duty of cooperation’.65 Still other courts say that the duty prevents a party from 
upsetting the other party’s justified, reasonable or legitimate expectations.66 Such 
expectations may arise from informal norms and from implicit understandings 
between the parties, not just the formal contractual documents.67 Enthusiasts for 
expansive views of the duty have endorsed it as a demand for acts of altruism 
towards one’s contractual partner,68 and as a requirement that one exercise one’s 
formal entitlements in a spirit of solidarity with the other party.69 Along similar 
lines, skeptics of broad conceptions of good faith have worried that the doctrine 
requires judicial enforcement of the Golden Rule or of Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative;70 that it enshrines ‘commercial Good Samaritanism’;71 or even that the 
good faith and fair dealing duty imposes a regime of ‘commercial palimony.’72 
61 Summers used this phrase in his 1968 article. Summers, supra note 40, at 195.  
62 Roughly speaking, relational contract theory explores the implications of the insight that contracts are 
embedded within a broader set of relations between the parties, an idea that has been a source of 
inspiration both for law-and-economics scholarship and for sociological scholarship on contracts. For an 
excellent recent overview of relational contract scholarship of both kinds, see Robert E. Scott, The Promise 
and Peril of Relational Contract Theory, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART 
MACAULAY (Jean Braucher, John Kidwell, and William C. Whitford, eds. 2013). 
63 E.g., Best v. United States National Bank of Oregon, 739 P.2d 554 (Or. 1987). 
64 E.g., Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. California, Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 728 (Cal. 1992). 
65 E.g., Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc., No. 2013 WI 56, 2013 WL 330598, — N.W.2d — (Wis. 2013); In 
re Estate of Chayka, 176 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Wis. 1970).  
66 E.g. Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1444 (7th Cir. 1992) (reasonable expectations); 
Carma Developers, 826 P.2d at 728 (legitimate expectations).  
67 See Joseph Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 101, 112–13 (2013). 
68 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1721 (1976) (in 
its most altruistic form, good faith could include ‘a duty to absorb some loss in order to avoid a larger 
loss to one’s contractual partner’). 
69 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY, TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 
210 (1976). 
70 White, supra note 5, at 690–91.  
71 See Gillette, supra note 4; see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty to Rescue in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 647, 666–70 (2002) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Duty to Rescue] (contending, more enthusiastically than 
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The duty of good faith and fair dealing has been invoked in several thousand 
cases, often successfully. And the duty has sometimes served as the basis for 
strikingly liberal impositions of liability. For example, in K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust 
Co.,73 the Sixth Circuit invigorated the field of ‘lender liability’ by applying the duty 
to a bank’s decision to refuse further advances to a borrower in financial 
difficulties. Without giving any notice, the lender dishonored checks drawn by the 
borrower, and the borrower’s business soon collapsed. Though the text of the 
parties’ loan agreement seemed to place no limits on the lender’s decision to grant 
or deny a request for further credit, the borrower provided expert testimony 
stating that a reasonable lender would at least have given notice of the denial so as 
to give the borrower time to find alternative sources of financing. Having been 
instructed to impose liability if the borrower had exercised its discretion 
unreasonably, the jury found a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, and awarded the borrower damages of $7.5 million; the Sixth Circuit 
upheld the verdict.74 The court stressed that the borrower was at the lender’s 
mercy, and that the parties had a long-term banking relationship.75 
 
B. THE LIMITED ENFORCEMENT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
 
Despite the expansive implications of a duty to engage in commercially reasonable 
behavior, judicial enforcement practices have usually fallen short of what 
Llewellyn seemed to intend. It is admittedly difficult to provide a comprehensive 
account of the case law on good faith performance, because there is no generally 
accepted doctrinal framework, and many decisions rely on judicial or jury intuition 
to distinguish between good faith and bad faith performance. Still, a large number 
of scholars reviewing the case law agree that the reality of enforcement has failed 
to match good faith’s definitional rhetoric.76 Courts often quickly undercut their 
own sweeping invocations of commercial reasonableness with statements that the 
task of implying terms based on the duty is a ‘cautious enterprise’,77 or that courts 
should not be ‘overly ambitious’ when applying the duty.78 In addition, courts 
have developed a myriad of doctrinal tests to limit the duty’s enforcement. As I 
explain below, courts often assess defendants’ conduct under deferential standards 
Gillette, that some instances of the duty of good faith performance exemplify a duty to rescue one’s 
contractual counterparty). 
72 Douglas K. Newell, Will Kindness Kill Contract?, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 455, 471 (1995). 
73 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).  
74 Id. at 760. 
75 As Steven Burton points out, the K.M.C. decision is an illustration of relational contract law (to which 
Burton himself is hostile). Steven J. Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2 of the U.C.C.: The Practice View, 35 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1533, 1554 (1994). 
76 For accounts stressing the divergence between rhetoric and reality enforcement in good faith and fair 
dealing cases, see Gillette, supra note 4; Houh, supra note 2; Imwinkelried, supra note 10; Dubroff, supra 
note 18. 
77 Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. Pshp. v. Cincinatti Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1998).  
78 Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 348 N.J. Super. 243 (2002). 
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of review; they sometimes require plaintiffs to establish improper motive or near-
dishonest conduct; they impose heightened burdens of proof on plaintiffs; and 
they sometimes allow pro-defendant norms to trump good faith and fair dealing. 
 
1. Deferential Standards of Review 
One way that courts restrict the effectiveness of good faith and fair dealing is by 
providing that the reasonableness of a defendant’s contractual performance should 
be reviewed under a deferential standard. Rather than decide for themselves what 
counts as bad faith or unreasonable behavior, courts explicitly allow the defendant 
some degree of latitude. For example, many courts state that, to ground a claim 
based on a defendant’s exercise of discretion, the plaintiff must establish that the 
decision was ‘arbitrary’ or ‘capricious’.79  
In some cases, courts have applied standards of review closely equivalent to 
corporate law’s business judgment rule. In corporate law, the business judgment 
rule involves the presumption that the Board of Directors acted independently, 
with due care, in good faith, and in the honest belief that its actions were in the 
stockholders’ best interests.80 The rule shields directors and officers from liability 
for failure to take due care where the challenged decision can be attributed to any 
rational business purpose; effectively, the rule limits liability to extreme cases.81 A 
similar approach emerges from a review of franchise litigation under various 
statutory and common-law good faith duties. Though one court in California has 
found a contractual provision unconscionable on the ground that it superimposed 
the business judgment rule on the duty of good faith and fair dealing,82 many 
franchise cases have actually applied something very like the business judgment 
rule when reviewing franchisor discretion, even without a contractual provision to 
that effect.83 
With similar effects, courts also constrain the good faith and fair dealing 
standard by superimposing doctrinal requirements in specified contexts to restrict 
the scope of a reasonableness test. The Supreme Court of Nevada’s decision in 
Davis v. Nevada National Bank,84 a lender liability case, provides an example. The 
defendant bank granted the plaintiffs a loan to finance the construction of their 
new home. Rather than simply advancing the money to the plaintiff, the bank 
reserved the power to disburse the funds to the builder. As construction 
progressed, the plaintiffs noticed serious structural defects in the foundations, and 
implored the bank to stop doling out their cash to the builder. Yet the bank 
continued to make advances, squandering the plaintiffs’ money on a fundamentally 
79 See, e.g., Wilson v. Amarada Hess Co., 773 A.2d 1121, 1131 (N.J. 2001). 
80 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984).  
81 Id. 
82 Vlahos v. Int’l Baking Co., Inc., A102335, 2005 WL 1632089, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. July 12, 2005). 
83 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 927, 984–85 (1990) (many courts have applied something like a business judgment approach to 
adjudicating good faith claims in franchise cases); Jeffrey C. Selman, Applying the Business Judgment Rule to 
the Franchise Relationship, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 111 (2000) (advocating explicit adoption of a business 
judgment rule by analogy to corporate law). 
84 737 P.2d 503 (Nev. 1987). 
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defective house. The bank’s conduct was certainly commercially unreasonable, but 
that alone was not enough to ground a claim. While accepting that the bank was 
under a duty of care,85 the court took pains to reject the idea of a general legally 
enforceable duty on the bank’s part to exercise care in the disbursement of the 
loan. It crafted more restrictive conditions for the duty to be applied by the jury, 
stating that ‘it would be unjust to permit a lender, with impunity, to simply disregard 
a borrower’s complaint of substantial construction deficiencies affecting the 
structural integrity of a project’.86 A genuine attempt to impose a full-blooded 
standard of commercial reasonableness would not stop there. 
 
2. Requiring Proof of Bad Motive or Borderline Duplicity 
As we have seen, at the level of definitional rhetoric, the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing can be breached by objectively unreasonable conduct, regardless 
of the actor’s motive or state of mental state.87 But courts have nevertheless 
developed doctrinal tests that focus the inquiry on the defendant’s state of mind.88 
Even where courts purport to be applying an ‘objective’ standard, they often 
require the plaintiff to establish an improper motive or borderline dishonesty. In 
this way, courts fall short of what a true attempt to enforce a norm of commercial 
reasonableness would involve. 
Again, franchise cases provide examples of this process. Courts adjudicating 
challenges by franchisees to the discretionary decisions of franchisors often 
impose a requirement of improper motive. In Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp.,89 for 
example, a gas station franchisee complained that the franchisor had exercised its 
discretion to raise prices so drastically that it drove the franchisee out of business. 
The court ruled that the franchisee would only be entitled to damages under the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing if it could show that the franchisor had acted 
from a ‘bad motive’.90 The court remanded the case for further discovery on the 
issue of whether the franchisor had acted with the intention of putting the 
franchisee out of business — an allegation the court admitted would be ‘difficult 
to prove’.91  
Sometimes, courts demand proof of something very close to dishonesty when 
applying the supposedly ‘objective’ standard of good faith and fair dealing. One 
particularly well-known example is Judge Posner’s opinion in Market Street 
85 Davis, 737 P.2d at 222. 
86 Id. at 222; see also id. at 224. 
87 E.g., Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. California, Inc., 2 Cal. 4th 342, 373, 826 P.2d 710, 
727 (1992) (‘Dishonesty presupposes subjective immorality; the covenant of good faith can be breached 
for objectively unreasonable conduct’). 
88 Sometimes statutory definitions of bad faith make clear that a defendant will be liable only for specified 
forms of wrongdoing. For example, the Automobile Dealer’s Day in Court Act limits actionable conduct 
to ‘coercion or intimidation or threats of coercion or intimidation of the dealer.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e). See, 
e.g., Paccar Inc. v. Elliot Wilson Capitol Trucks LLC, 905 F. Supp. 2d 675, 685 (D. Md. 2012). 
89 773 A.2d 1121 (N.J. 2001). 
90 Id. at 1130–31. 
91 Id. at 1131.  
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Associates v. Frey.92 The case involved a real estate sale and leaseback transaction, 
originally entered into for financing purposes between a retail tenant and a 
landlord in 1968. The lease entitled the tenant to ask the landlord to finance 
repairs to the property. The contract also stated that, if negotiations over financing 
the requested improvements failed, the tenant could repurchase the property at a 
price determined by a formula. Almost twenty years later, a new tenant requested 
financing to build a new store. At this time, the contract’s price formula evidently 
offered the tenant a knock-down price for the property. The landlord rejected the 
financing request out of hand, having forgotten the extreme consequences of a 
failure of negotiations. Seeking to avoid the automatic sale provision, the landlord 
invoked the duty of good faith and fair dealing.  
Judge Posner applied a narrow conception of the duty’s requirements. He 
accepted that it would be inconsistent with good faith to ‘take deliberate advantage 
of an oversight by your contract partner concerning his rights under the 
contract’.93 The dispositive question, on Judge Posner’s view, was ‘simply whether 
[the tenant] tried to trick [the landlord] and succeeded in doing so’.94 As Todd 
Rakoff has shown,95 Judge Posner’s opinion does not explain convincingly why 
his ‘anti-trickery’ reading of good faith and fair dealing is preferable to the District 
Court’s finding that the duty simply required the tenant to notify the landlord of 
the contract’s terms as a precondition for seeking to invoke them. But Judge 
Posner’s view is in keeping with a series of other judicial opinions — including his 
own96 — stating that good faith and fair dealing does not necessarily entail the 
judicial enforcement of commercial reasonableness, even though legislatures and 
courts often express the norm in those terms. 
  
3. Imposing Heightened Evidentiary Burdens 
Another way that courts discourage resort to the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing is by erecting evidentiary hurdles in front of plaintiffs who seek to invoke 
it. The most explicit example comes from government contract litigation. The 
federal common law of government contracting recognizes the implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing.97 But where a private contractor claims a breach, 
courts apply a strong presumption that government officials acted in good faith.98 
That presumption can be overcome only if the plaintiff provides ‘well-nigh 
92 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame A Contract Breaker, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 1349 (2009).  
93 Market Street Assocs., 941 F.2d at 596. 
94 Id. at 596. On remand, the District Court conducted a bench trial, and ruled that there was a breach of 
the duty of good faith even under Judge Posner’s restrictive standard. Market. St. Associates Ltd. P’ship 
v. Frey, 817 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Wis. 1993), aff’d 21 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 1994). 
95 Todd Rakoff, Good Faith in Contract Performance: Market Street Associates v. Frey, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1187 
(2007).  
96 E.g., Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 
280 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that reasonableness is not the test for good faith). 
97 See, e.g., Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283, 1304 (Fed.Cir.2005). 
98 See Bryan O. Ramos, Never Say Die: The Continued Existence of the Government Officials’ Good Faith 
Presumption in Federal Contracting Law, 63 A.F. L. REV. 163 (2009). 
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irrefragable proof’,99 or, in more modern language, ‘clear and convincing 
evidence’,100 of bad faith. The application of this heavy presumption of good faith 
to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing appears to be the product of 
historical confusion.101 Nevertheless, it seems to have survived a recent judicial 
attempt to confine it to cases where ‘a government official is accused of fraud or 
quasi-criminal wrongdoing in the exercise of his official duties’,102 and continues 
to apply to ordinary breaches of the implied covenant by the federal 
government.103 
A heightened evidentiary burden makes it particularly difficult to establish a 
breach of good faith when it is combined, as it often appears to be, with a 
requirement of proof of improper motive.104 Plaintiffs do sometimes prevail in 
government contracting suits based on the implied covenant. In one recent case, 
the judge made a finding of bad faith, having reviewed internal communications 
among officials and concluded the plaintiff had proved, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that a number of Army officials had engaged in a ‘prolonged campaign 
to harm’ the plaintiff.105 But a plaintiff will generally need to engage in extensive 
and costly discovery to find the necessary degree of proof, and, as a result, many 
government contractors presumably decide not to file suit at all. 
 
4. Giving Precedence to Other Legal Norms 
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is supposedly implied into every contract, 
giving rise to the potential for conflict with other implied contract law norms. In 
particular, the good faith norm conflicts with the general American rule of at-will 
employment, under which employment under an indefinite contract of 
employment can be terminated for any reason,106 or for no reason at all. The 
dominant trend is to subordinate the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing in the 
field of employment terminations. 
It once appeared that the new contract law duty would take precedence over 
the at-will norm. In a series of decisions in the 1970s and 1980s,107 several courts 
99 Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1323 n. 2 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
100 Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1239–40 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
101 See Stuart B. Nibley & Jade Totman, Let the Government Contract: The Sovereign Has the Right, and Good 
Reason, to Shed Its Sovereignty When It Contracts, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1 (2012). 
102 Tecom, Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 736, 769 (Fed. Cl. 2005). 
103 See Road & Highway Builders, LLC v. United States, 702 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (rejecting 
argument that presumption of good faith should be limited to fraud or quasi-criminal wrongdoing); 
Nibley & Totman, supra note 101 at 24; Ramos, supra note 98. 
104 See, e.g., Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817, 829–30 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
D’Andrea Bros. LLC v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 205, 222 (2010). 
105 North Star Alaska Housing Corp. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 158 (2007). 
106 Other than those reasons barred by antidiscrimination statutes.  
107 E.g. Hoffman La-Roche v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 738 (Ala. 1987); Kmart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 
P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987); Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985); Mitford v. de LaSala, 666 
P.2d 1000 (Alas. 1983); Cleary v. Am. Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Fortune v. 
Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1976); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 
(N.H. 1974). 
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applied the Summers-Restatement logic to employment terminations as an 
exception to the rule of at-will employment. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court explicitly linked the emerging norm against bad faith termination of an at-
will employment contract to the Restatement’s provision on good faith and fair 
dealing.108 The jury had held for the plaintiff based on a theory of bad faith 
termination, in a case where the employer had fired a salesman for the purpose of 
depriving him of bonuses to which he was about to become entitled. The SJC 
upheld the verdict even though the literal words of the contract gave the employer 
the power to terminate the contract without cause at any time.109  
But the tide has turned against the application of the good faith norm to 
terminations of indefinite employment arrangements. Faced with a conflict of 
norms, the majority of states simply award victory to the at-will norm; they do not 
permit the implied covenant to operate. Courts rejecting the duty in the 
employment setting claim that the implied covenant is just too vague110 (a 
somewhat unconvincing contention, given that the covenant applies to every other 
contract), or find that it is simply incoherent to have a rule of at-will employment 
while simultaneously restricting that doctrine with a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.111 In the at-will employment setting, then, even proof of bad-faith motive 
will generally not ground a claim for breach of contract. Even the states that 
originally recognized the application of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in 
this field have ‘circumscribed the covenant’s impact in what amount to 
expressions of judicial remorse’.112 The Supreme Court of California, for example, 
now says that, notwithstanding the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an at-
will employer ‘may act peremptorily, arbitrarily, or inconsistently, without 
providing specific protections such as prior warning, fair procedures, objective 
evaluation, or preferential reassignment’.113 
 
C. PROPOSALS TO CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY  
 
Scholars seeking to make sense of this area of contract law have assumed that 
courts must bring the rhetoric of good faith into line with the reality of 
enforcement — or vice versa. Among those skeptical of broad judicial 
pronouncements, doubts about full-blooded enforcement of good faith and fair 
dealing find an intellectual foundation in the ‘neoformalist’ trend in contracts 
scholarship.114 The duty of good faith and fair dealing was a product of the realist 
and contextualist reaction to classical formalism, so it is no surprise that it has 
108 Fortune, 364 N.E.2d 1251. 
109 Id. at 1258. 
110 Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W. 2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983). 
111 Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 506 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y. 1987). 
112 James J. Brudney, Reluctance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in American 
Employment Law, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 773, 774 (2011).  
113 Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1110 (Cal. 2000). 
114 For overviews of contract law neoformalism, see David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 842 (1999); William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 
971 (2001).  
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come under fire from neoformalists both on the bench and in academia. Robert 
Scott, for example, contends that the cost of having courts discern commercial 
reasonableness exceeds any benefits it could bring to the parties.115 Lisa Bernstein, 
another critic of the U.C.C.’s strategy of incorporating commercial reasonableness, 
concludes that the idea of good faith plays only a very minor role in private 
arbitration systems chosen by commercial parties to adjudicate their own 
disputes.116  
The most obvious implication of these arguments is that courts should ‘level 
down’ the rhetoric of good faith to reflect the limited reality of enforcement. In 
their strongest form, leveling-down accounts argue that courts and legislatures 
should abandon the good faith and fair dealing norm.117 A slightly less direct way 
to level down the duty is to pay lip-service to it, but to tie the contours of the duty 
to the literal words of the contract’s text. A basic starting point for the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing is that the contract’s written words do not provide an 
exhaustive guide to the contract’s terms.118 Yet Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in 
Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting states another view of good 
faith and fair dealing’s meaning.119 The case concerned an attempt to subordinate 
a lender’s claim in bankruptcy for inequitable conduct, based on conduct broadly 
similar to the conduct at issue in the Sixth Circuit’s K.M.C. decision.120 Judge 
Easterbrook took the opportunity to disagree with K.M.C., stating that ‘[u]nless 
pacts are enforced according to their terms, the institution of contract, with all the 
advantages private negotiation and agreement brings, is jeopardized’.121 
Accordingly, he continued, parties must be allowed to enforce the terms of their 
agreement ‘to the letter, even to the great discomfort of their trading partners, 
without being mulcted for lack of ‘good faith’.’122 For Judge Easterbrook, the 
borrower had no hope of establishing bad faith, because the text of the contract 
115 See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1688 
(2003) (arguing that ‘an attempt to enforce deliberately incomplete contracts by adopting a broad 
standard of reasonableness or good faith is socially inefficient’). 
116 See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms 
and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1735 (2001) (claiming that ‘notions of good faith and fairness do 
not appear to affect case outcomes’ under private arbitration in the cotton industry); Lisa Bernstein, 
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court; Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1765, 1775–76 (1996) (stating that arbitrators for the National Grain and Feed Association never rely on 
a general duty of good faith, though conceding that the term ‘good faith’ is used in some arbitration 
decisions). Bernstein admits that notions of good faith and substantive fairness ‘may influence the 
outcome of arbitration cases in ways that cannot be detected by reading opinions’. Id. at 1776 n.37. 
117 Dubroff, supra note 18; Victor Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts: Reining in Good 
Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 319 (2002) (contending that courts are ill-equipped to police exercises of 
discretion in long-term contracts); Mark Snyderman, What’s So Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith 
Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335, 1338 (1988). 
118 See Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. 
REV. 503 (1991). 
119 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990). 
120 See supra text to note 73. 
121 Kham, 908 F.2d at 1357. 
122 Id. at 1357. 
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afforded a discretion to the borrower without explicitly limiting that discretion. 
Good faith, he said, cannot ‘block [the] use of terms that actually appear in the 
contract’.123  
As Judge Antonin Scalia once explained, the upshot of a strongly textualist 
approach would be ‘virtually to read the doctrine of good faith […] out of 
existence’.124 Though the textualist approach to good faith has not completely 
swept the board,125 it has had some effect on judicial decisions.126 In particular 
cases, the contract’s express language is said to preclude the plaintiff’s attempt to 
invoke the good faith and fair dealing norm. Even in jurisdictions that often give 
effect to the duty of good faith, strongly textualist statements appear 
spasmodically.127 Courts sometimes say that ‘[t]he implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing is limited to assuring compliance with the express terms of the 
contract, and cannot be extended to create obligations not contemplated by the 
contract’.128 In a recent case decided under Pennsylvania law, a federal district 
court judge even refused to give any effect to an express covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, requiring the plaintiff to establish a breach of some other express 
term.129 Though subsequent courts applying the implied duty of good faith and 
fair dealing have explicitly rejected the court’s error,130 the fact that a federal judge 
could make such a mistake is a strong indication of the doctrine’s vulnerability to 
textualist claims. 
Relatedly, many courts recite the claim that the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing provides no ‘independent’ or ‘separate’ cause of action.131 Sometimes, 
courts use this language to make the uncontroversial point that a breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing provides a claim for breach of contract, 
123 Id. at 1357. 
124 Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1153–54 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
125 For example, in July 2013, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided Beidel v. Sideline Software, 2013 WL 
330598. The majority decision permitted a claim based on the covenant to proceed, despite an absence of 
explicit textual warrant for the claimed duty. The majority disapproved approaches to interpretation that 
follow ‘the letter but not the spirit of an agreement’. Id. at *7. The dissent, with approving citations to 
Judge Easterbrook, complained that majority was overriding the contract’s express text.  
126 See Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223 
(1999); Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 11–12; In re Facebook PPC Adver. Litig., 709 F. Supp. 2d 762, 770 
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that an express term of contract placing risk of improper actions by a third 
party on one of the contracting parties precluded a good faith and fair dealing claim seeking to reallocate 
that risk). 
127 See, e.g., Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. D-Mart Food Stores, Inc., 431 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1988) (‘where, as here, a contracting party complains of acts of the other party which are specifically 
authorized in their agreement, we do not see how there can be any breach of the covenant of good faith’). 
128 See, e.g., Pasadena Live, LLC v. City of Pasadena, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1089, 1094 (2004). 
129 Sheinman Provisions, Inc. v. National Deli, LLC, No. 08-cv-453, 2008 WL 2758029, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
July 15, 2008); see also Benchmark Group, Inc. v. Penn Tank Lines, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 2d 562, 584 
(E.D.Pa. 2009) (extending the same error to a case based on the implied covenant).  
130 See, e.g., Kamco Indus. Sales, Inc. v. Lovejoy, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 2d 416, 426 n. 8 (E.D.Pa. 2009). 
131 Northstar Industries, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 944, 948 (D. Minn. 2008); 
Kermanshah v. Kermanshah, 580 F. Supp. 2d 247, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); CapitalSource Fin. LLC v. 
Pittsfield Weaving Co., 571 F. Supp. 2d 668, 673 (D. Md. 2006); Bay Fireworks, Inc. v. Frenkel & Co., 
Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 257, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The Permanent Editorial Board added a similar 
statement to the commentary on the Code. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD COMMENTARY ON THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, NO. 10 (Feb. 10, 1994). 
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not a tort claim. Similarly, courts have also used the same idea at the pleading stage 
to clarify that a suit based on good faith and fair dealing is a species of claim for 
breach of contract, not an alternative cause of action. But for many courts, the ‘no 
independent cause of action’ line — like the textualist approach — has become a 
piece of boilerplate doctrine, to be deployed when rejecting claims that do not find 
judicial favor. 
An alternative reaction to the disparity between rhetoric and reality in good 
faith is to hold the rhetoric constant, while advocating an increase in enforcement 
activity to match that rhetoric. In commercial cases, this ‘leveling-up’ strategy is 
exemplified by Richard Speidel’s argument that courts should seek out and enforce 
implicit relational norms under the doctrine of good faith performance, using the 
doctrine to lend judicial force to requirements that parties cooperate, share risks, 
and act in ways that preserve the parties’ relationship.132 Another ‘leveling-up’ 
argument is to be found in Emily Houh’s contention that courts should ramp up 
their enforcement practices to bring them into line with an expansive vision of 
societal equality.133 Houh argues that the duty of good faith and fair dealing should 
be used to provide remedies to victims of unconscious gender and racial 
subordination in the contracting process, even where remedies under civil rights 
statutes are unavailable in such cases. Yet another version of the ‘leveling up’ 
strategy is Chunlin Leonhard’s argument that courts should use the good faith and 
fair dealing doctrine to combat ‘a business culture of everyone for themselves’.134 
Leonhard contends that courts adjudicating claims under the doctrine should 
impose liability where a reasonable person would find the conduct unacceptable, 
and that courts should impose supra-compensatory remedies in the event of a 
breach of this negligence standard.135  
 
 
 
II. UNDERENFORCED LEGAL NORMS 
 
Though in one sense their positions are diametrically opposed, advocates of the 
leveling-down and leveling-up strategies share a common assumption. Both sides 
assume that the scope of the good faith and fair dealing norm is, or should be, 
coextensive with judicial enforcement of that norm. In this way, partisans on both 
sides are characteristic of contracts scholars more generally; the idea that a legal 
norm can be valid beyond the boundaries of judicial enforcement is unfamiliar in 
132 Speidel, supra note 19, at 796–77. 
133 Houh, supra note 19.  
134 Chunlin Leonhard, Subprime Mortgages and the Case for Broadening the Duty of Good Faith, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 
621, 622 (2011). 
135 Id. at 635–36. Leonhard also advocates the extension of good faith and fair dealing to the pre-
contractual phase. 
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contracts scholarship.136 But the idea has a respectable intellectual provenance in 
other legal fields, and finds support in writings on general jurisprudence. So, in 
this Part, I begin the process of defending my claim that good faith and fair 
dealing is an underenforced legal norm by reaching outside the law of contracts.  
The best-known discussion of divergences between legal norms and the rules 
for their enforcement in the American legal literature is probably Meir Dan-
Cohen’s article on criminal law.137 Dan-Cohen shows that we can understand legal 
rules as being addressed to two audiences: rules addressed to the general public, 
and rules addressed to legal officials in their capacity as legal officials.138 A law 
against theft, as Bentham long ago pointed out, can be understood as saying both 
‘let no man steal’ and ‘let the judge cause whoever is convicted of stealing to be 
hanged’.139 In Dan-Cohen’s terminology, the former is a ‘conduct rule’ for citizens 
to follow; the latter is a ‘decision rule’ for courts to apply. Typically, conduct rules 
and decision rules correspond in criminal law, in that courts follow a decision rule 
requiring them to impose sanctions in the event of any breach of a given conduct 
rule.  
But, Dan-Cohen shows, it is logically possible for gaps to open up between 
conduct rules and decision rules. So, in the hypothetical example on which Dan-
Cohen focuses, criminal law might contain a conduct rule that intentional killing is 
forbidden, even in circumstances of necessity. Simultaneously, however, the law 
might contain a decision rule that shields a necessitous killer from conviction. In 
addition to exposing the logical possibility of divergence between conduct rules 
and decision rules, Dan-Cohen’s article explores the legitimacy of hiding such 
divergences from the general populace. But the distinction between conduct rules 
and decision rules is not itself premised on deception; divergences between 
conduct rules and decision rules might be openly acknowledged and 
communicated to citizens. Though Dan-Cohen does not use the term 
‘underenforcement’, his necessity-as-a-defense-to-murder example is an illustration 
of an underenforced conduct rule: the law defines as murder, and forbids, killing 
in necessitous circumstances, but no legal sanctions will attach to the violation of 
the rule where the judge or jury finds that the defendant acted out of necessity.  
 
 
 
 
136 See, e.g., Klass, supra note 20. One possible exception to the generalization in the text an article by 
Emily Sherwin on remedies for breach of contract, which uses a somewhat similar idea to bridge the gap 
between the rhetoric of remedies for breach of contract and the reality of judicial enforcement. Emily L. 
Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD. L. REV. 253, 300-14 (1991) (the disparity between 
rights and remedies in contract law gives rise to ‘acoustic separation’).  
137 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 21.  
138 Id. at 627. 
139 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in A FRAGMENT ON 
GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (W. Harrison 
ed., 1948). 
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A. UNDERENFORCED NORMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
Though the conduct rule-decision rule distinction has been deployed fruitfully in 
criminal law,140 constitutional law is the site of the most elaborate scholarly work 
— so much so that there is an accepted genre of scholarship adopting a 
‘constitutional decision rules’ model.141 Scholars adopting this model draw a 
distinction between, on the one hand, what the Constitution requires or authorizes 
(referred to in the literature as ‘constitutional meaning’ or ‘constitutional operative 
propositions’142 — i.e. conduct rules) and, on the other hand, judicial doctrines 
whose function is to implement those conduct rules (‘implementing doctrines’ — 
i.e. decision rules). For the most part, the text of the Constitution leaves the task 
of devising decision rules to the courts. Most constitutional adjudication does not 
involve interpretation of the constitutional text, so much as the development of ‘a 
substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their 
inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional 
provisions’.143 On this view, constitutional law doctrine implements, but does not 
always track, the norms set forth in the Constitution itself. Working in this vein, 
Richard Fallon has defended the ‘permissible disparity thesis’ — the claim that ‘a 
[justifiable] gap frequently exists between constitutional meaning and judicially 
enforced doctrine’.144 Where constitutional conduct rules extend to a broader 
degree of circumstances than those reached by the corresponding decision rule, 
the effect is an underenforced constitutional norm.145  
 
1. Underenforcement and Political Questions  
Let’s begin with the clearest example of judicial underenforcement of legal norms 
in American constitutional law:146 the political question doctrine. When a plaintiff 
brings an action seeking relief on the basis that the defendant’s action violated the 
Constitution, or that a legislative enactment under which the defendant acted is 
unconstitutional, the defendant may respond in several ways. Most 
straightforwardly, the defendant can join issue on the merits, and rebut the claim 
140 See Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 730 (1990). 
141 For an extensive review, see Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004).  
142 For reasons mostly specific to constitutional law, Mitchell Berman prefers the term ‘constitutional 
operative propositions’ to ‘conduct rules.’ Berman, supra note 141, at 58 n.192. I will stick with ‘conduct 
rules’ to preserve symmetry with the rest of the paper.  
143 Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1975); see also 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57 (1997) [hereinafter 
Fallon, Implementing the Constitution]. 
144 Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards, supra note 23, 1278–79. 
145 Outside the United States, one can find even clearer examples of unenforced constitutional duties. For 
example, the Irish Constitution requires the legislature to apply ‘directive principles of social policy,’ 
including socio-economic rights, while explicitly providing that these principles ‘shall not be cognisable 
by any Court under any of the provisions of this Constitution.’ CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND, ART. 45. 
Conversely, courts sometimes engage in ‘overenforcement,’ by adopting prophylactic rules to protect 
constitutional rights. See Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards, supra note 23, at 1303–06. 
146 Sager, supra note 26, at 1224–25; Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards, supra note 23, 1280–97.  
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of unconstitutionality. But, alternatively, the defendant can respond that the claim 
should be dismissed because it raises a nonjusticiable political question. When a 
court dismisses a constitutional claim on the ground that it raises a nonjusticiable 
political question, the court does not say that the defendant has not violated the 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rather, the court simply declines to decide the 
issue. At least sometimes, then, courts must be rejecting valid constitutional 
claims.  
In political question cases, the reasons given for declining to enforce the 
Constitution to its fullest extent stem from the institutional features of courts. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Vieth v. Jubilirer147 is a particularly clear illustration of 
the point. The plaintiffs complained that the defendants had engaged in partisan 
gerrymandering in drawing electoral districts, and claimed that the defendants’ 
conduct violated the Constitution. Writing for the plurality in Vieth, Justice Scalia 
assumed, for the sake of argument, that ‘an excessive injection of politics [into the 
redistricting process] is unlawful’ under the Equal Protection Clause.148 He 
maintained nonetheless that the federal courts should not even try to adjudicate 
partisan gerrymandering claims. Legislatures, he said, can pass laws that are 
‘inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc,’ but, ‘law pronounced by the courts must be 
principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions’.149 Accordingly, courts 
must develop ‘judicially discernible and manageable standards’ for adjudicating 
claims. Justice Scalia reviewed various proposed doctrinal tests for partisan 
gerrymandering claims, and found that none provided sufficient guidance to 
courts to save them from confusion and arbitrariness. Sometimes, and, for the 
majority of the Supreme Court, Vieth was one of those times, ‘the judicial 
department has no business entertaining the claim of unlawfulness — because the 
question is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no judicially 
enforceable rights’.150 
Leaving aside the particular claim of nonjusticiability in Vieth, the case shows 
that the absence of judicially manageable standards sometimes leads to a gap 
between the constitutional conduct rule (in this case, the norm of equal 
protection) and the decision rules applied by courts. In at least some instances, 
constitutional underenforcement may well be justified, for precisely the kinds of 
institutional reasons the Supreme Court has offered in support of it. Broadly 
speaking, these reasons stem from concerns about the court’s limited expertise 
and its own lack of direct democratic legitimacy. In addition to a desire for 
judicially manageable standards, the Supreme Court has given the following 
reasons that may support a finding that a case raises a nonjusticiable political 
question: ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political branch’; ‘the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
147 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
148 Id. at 293. 
149 Id. at 248. 
150 Id. at 277. 
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branches of government’; ‘an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made’; ‘or the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question’.151 None 
of these institutional reasons affects the validity of a constitutional norm invoked 
by a plaintiff. Rather, each bears on the suitability of specifically judicial 
determinations of whether or not the government actor has violated that norm.  
It is often meaningful to say that an action is unconstitutional, even if no 
court will ever rule on the issue. Government officials should follow the 
Constitution whether or not their acts can be challenged in court. For example, 
many recent actions by executive officials engaged in counterterrorism efforts will 
probably never be challenged in a court of law because of the political question 
doctrine, standing doctrines, and executive immunity doctrines (another significant 
source of judicial underenforcement). But a claim of unconstitutionality has 
significant resonance in the court of public opinion, and at least some officials 
consider themselves bound in conscience to act within the constitution’s limits. 
For these reasons, officials take great pains to convince themselves and others — 
often implausibly — that their actions are compliant with the Constitution and 
other binding sources of law, even where there is no prospect of judicially 
imposed sanctions.152  
 
2. Subtler Examples of Underenforcement: Doctrinal Tests 
The examples in the previous section provide relatively obvious examples of 
constitutional conduct rules extending beyond the boundaries of judicial decision 
rules. But constitutional law doctrine contains many subtler, less openly 
acknowledged, forms of underenforcement. In constitutional adjudication, 
interpretation of the constitution’s text is pervasively supplemented by doctrinal 
tests devised by the Supreme Court. These doctrinal tests supply precisely the 
kinds of judicially manageable standards identified in the political question 
jurisprudence as a precondition of enforcement by the courts. Yet the very same 
standards often entail partial underenforcement of the conduct rules they 
implement.  
The most obvious kinds of doctrinal test that give rise to underenforcement 
are those explicitly mandating deference to other governmental institutions. For 
example, in due process challenges to disciplinary actions by prison authorities, 
courts will reject the claim so long as ‘some evidence’ supports the disciplinary 
action.153 This doctrinal test means that, so long as the record contains some 
indication of justifiability, a prisoner who is innocent of the alleged misconduct, 
and whose punishment was motivated by malice, has no judicially cognizable due 
151 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
152 See Frederick Schauer, Official Obedience and the Politics of Defining ‘Law,’ University of Virginia Law 
School, Public Law and Legal Theory Paper Series 2013-11, available at ssrn.com. 
153 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of ‘Some Evidence’, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 631 
(1988). 
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process claim.154 Similarly, the court applies a principle of judicial deference to 
military regulations,155 on the ground that courts are often ill-equipped to second-
guess military decisions. Where courts defer to a legislative or executive actor’s 
determination in the course of assessing the constitutionality of its action, courts 
must, at least sometimes, be leaving actual constitutional violations unremedied.  
The example on which I will focus is perhaps the grandest constitutional 
norm: the Equal Protection Clause. While equal protection claims are sometimes 
completely excluded from a given field under the political question doctrine,156 
they are more often subjected to more understated forms of underenforcement.157 
The Clause provides simply that ‘no state shall […] deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’158 But equal protection litigation 
does not proceed simply by laying the government action side by side with the text 
of the Clause and checking for consistency. First, the Clause itself requires 
interpretation to discern its meaning. The Supreme Court has said that the Clause 
is ‘a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike’.159 The 
Clause may mean that a state may only treat persons differently when it is fair to 
do so,160 or that the government may not classify individuals in ways not 
reasonably designed to promote a legitimate state interest,161 or that the 
government may not engage in discrimination that shows a lack of equal concern 
and respect for a particular group.162 No interpretation commands universal 
assent, and plausible interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause tend to be 
both highly demanding and vague.  
For these reasons, the Supreme Court has developed decision rules for equal 
protection cases. In the courts, advocacy is generally structured around that 
judicially created doctrinal framework. The Supreme Court’s main doctrinal tool in 
equal protection cases involves sorting measures into three different boxes: those 
deserving strict scrutiny, those deserving intermediate scrutiny, and those subject 
only to rational basis review. Racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, 
whereby the government is under a burden to establish that the action is narrowly 
tailored to a compelling government interest.163 Classifications based on gender 
are subject to an intermediate form of scrutiny, under which the government must 
show a substantial relationship to an important government interest.164 But 
154 Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards, supra note 23 at 1300–01. 
155 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
156 E.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. 267. 
157 Sager, supra note 26, at 1215–20; Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards, supra note 23, at 1297–98; see also 
Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN L. REV. 311 (1987).  
158 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
159 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).  
160 E.g. Sager, supra note 26, at 1215. 
161 See Berman, supra note 141, at 9. 
162 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 193 (2006).  
163 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 
(2007). 
164 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (the justification for a gender-based 
classification must be ‘exceedingly persuasive’); id. at 559 (Rehnquist J., concurring) (‘a gender-based 
classification must bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives’).  
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heightened scrutiny of either kind is exceptional; most government actions are 
subject only to rational basis review. Under rational basis review, government 
action is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging the action will 
prevail only if she establishes that it bears no rational relationship to any legitimate 
governmental objective.165  
These tiers of review cannot seriously be defended as forming part of the 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.166 Rather, they are constitutional decision 
rules, justifiable (if at all) only by reference to the Supreme Court’s perception of 
its institutional competence and, relatedly, to the perceived need to defer to 
legislative will for reasons of legitimacy. Starting with the assumption that racial 
classifications are especially unlikely to be justified, the court applies strict scrutiny 
in such cases so that it can ‘“smoke out” illegitimate uses of race by assuring that 
[government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly 
suspect tool’.167 The rational basis test, conversely, is a ‘salutary principle of 
judicial decision’, among the ‘self-imposed restraints intended to protect [the 
Supreme Court] and the state against irresponsible exercise of [the Supreme 
Court’s] unappealable power’.168 All statutes discriminate between people, but the 
fairness of such classifications is best primarily left to the political process.169 In 
the vast array of cases subject only to rational basis review, the constitutional norm 
of equal protection — whatever it means — is substantially underenforced in the 
courts.170  
Another important feature of equal protection litigation is its focus on 
governmental purpose or motive.171 Sometimes, the Supreme Court’s focus on the 
government actor’s motive favors plaintiffs. Even in cases formally governed by 
rational basis review, the Supreme Court has sometimes struck down measures 
because they were motivated by animus towards an unpopular group. This form 
of review began in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,172 a challenge to 
Congress’s decision to deny food stamps to individuals who lived in households 
with other unmarried adults to whom they were not related. Though a rational 
basis could surely be found for Congress’s action, the Supreme Court concluded 
that the measure was aimed at discriminating against hippies, and, on that basis, 
165 See, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2079 (2012). 
166 See Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards, supra note 23, at 1297–98 (‘None of these tests tracks the 
language of the Equal Protection Clause, nor has the Supreme Court attempted to link them to the 
original historical understanding’); Berman, supra note 141 at 81–82 (noting that it is ‘hard to imagine that 
the strict scrutiny test constitutes any part of the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause’).  
167 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2337–38 (2003).  
168 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247 (1970) (the rational basis test in equal protection cases is ‘is a 
limitation stemming, not from the Fourteenth Amendment itself, but from the nature of judicial review’). 
169 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
170 Ross, supra note 157, at 315 (‘Through sparing use of heightened scrutiny and extensive application of 
the deferential rational basis test, the Court has adopted a policy of underenforcing equal protection 
issues.’). 
171 On purpose tests in constitutional law more generally, see Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra 
note 143, at 71–73, 90–94.  
172 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
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found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Subsequent decisions have held 
unconstitutional measures motivated by animus towards undocumented 
children,173 people with mental disabilities,174 and gay people.175 
More often, however, the Supreme Court’s focus on motive redounds to the 
government’s benefit. To invoke heightened scrutiny, the judicially enforced 
version of the Equal Protection Clause requires the plaintiff challenging a facially 
neutral measure to establish that an official decisionmaker was motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose.176 In suits brought pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a disparate impact, no matter how disproportionate, foreseeable, and 
unfair, will not suffice to sustain the suit (though it may provide evidence of the 
required discriminatory purpose). The Equal Protection Clause itself says nothing 
about motive; states can treat people unfairly without acting with a discriminatory 
motive. If the Supreme Court’s requirement of purpose is to be justified, then, it 
must be supported by pragmatic reasons. In Washington v. Davis, Justice White 
offered just such a reason. He claimed that a rule requiring a compelling 
justification for legislative measures that have a racially disparate impact would be 
‘far reaching’ and would call into question a whole range of tax, welfare, public 
service, and licensing statutes.177 Here, as elsewhere in constitutional law, a 
purpose test provides a minimal protection against unconstitutional conduct, but 
its reach falls short of total enforcement.178 The Court left to Congress the 
decision about whether and when judges should engage in strict scrutiny of 
measures having a racially disparate impact. 
Indeed, the Constitution explicitly confers on Congress a power to create 
decision rules for equal protection cases,179 illustrating the proposition that 
constitutional law is not just what the judges say it is. With its distinct institutional 
capacities and sources of legitimacy, Congress is — at least sometimes180 — able 
to supply remedies where the Court has declined to act. Moreover, regardless of 
judicially or congressionally mandated enforcement, the equal protection norm is 
valid as a conduct rule binding other government actors. Legislators and other 
government officials remain independently bound to comply with equal 
173 Plyler, 457 U.S. 202. 
174 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
175 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
176 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  
177 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.  
178 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1081 (2010) (‘When 
important constitutional values are at stake, and it is difficult for the Supreme Court to agree on an 
alternative test of constitutional validity to protect those values, purpose tests provide a minimal 
protection against abuses of governmental power.’).  
179 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (‘The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article.’). 
180 In a long line of cases beginning in the mid-1990s, the Supreme Court has jealously guarded its 
prerogative to determine the scope of constitutional rights, and has struck down several congressional 
attempts to expand access to judicial remedies under the Equal Protection Clause and other elements of 
the Reconstruction Amendments. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Board of 
Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. __ (2013). 
But even on the Court’s view of the scope of the enforcement power, Congress has some power to 
design appropriate decision rules for courts.  
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protection, and should not limit their constitutional calculations to asking if 
judicial doctrine would spell victory in litigation.  
To be clear, I do not seek to defend the particular forms of 
underenforcement chosen by the Supreme Court, many of which have been 
subjected to powerful criticism. But, for the purposes of illuminating the law of 
contracts by analogy, I adopt the following aspects of the constitutional law 
literature: the analytical distinction between conduct rules and decision rules; the 
descriptive claim that the Supreme Court has often chosen the path of 
underenforcement in constitutional cases; and the relatively weak normative claim 
that perfect judicial enforcement of demanding, open-ended constitutional norms, 
even if attainable, is undesirable. 
 
B. UNDERENFORCEMENT IN CORPORATE LAW 
 
A similar phenomenon is at work in corporate law. Though it appears that no-one 
has explicitly made the link with the constitutional law literature, a body of 
scholarship shows that the law of directors’ and officers’ duties also consists of 
partially underenforced legal norms. About twenty years ago, Melvin Eisenberg 
pointed to a gap between what courts say directors and officers must do 
(‘standards of conduct’) and the doctrines that courts apply when enforcing these 
duties (‘standards of review’).181 Eisenberg contended that ‘the standards of review 
in corporate law pervasively diverge from the standards of conduct’.182 The idea 
has even been incorporated into the ABA’s Model Business Corporation Act.183 
Directors and officers, for example, are subject to a duty of care in the 
management of the corporation. When explaining the duty of care, courts say that 
a director or officer must take the care that an ordinarily prudent person would 
reasonably be expected to take in the circumstances.184 This standard, as 
Eisenberg says, is ‘fairly demanding’.185 Nevertheless, directors and officers will 
often escape legal liability for many breaches of the duty of care. That is because, 
when they come to court, claims for breach of the duty of care are frequently 
adjudicated under deferential standards such as the business judgment rule.186 To 
surmount the business judgment rule, it is not enough to show that the 
defendant’s decision or action was unreasonable; the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant is guilty of subjective bad faith, or that the decision was irrational.187 It 
181 Eisenberg, Divergence, supra note 24. 
182 Id. at 438.  
183 See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30 & 8.31 (2011). 
184 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) (1994). 
185 Eisenberg, Divergence, supra note 24, at 440. 
186 Some claims for breach of the duty of care are adjudicated not under the business judgment rule but 
under some other limited decision rule, such as a gross negligence test. Eisenberg, Divergence, supra note 
24, at 447–49. 
187 Id. at 439–43. 
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is much easier for directors and officers to escape liability under rationality review 
that it would be under reasonableness review. The business judgment rule 
‘preserves a minimum and necessary degree of director and officer accountability’, 
but it is ‘considerably less demanding than the relevant standard of conduct, which 
is based on reasonableness’.188 
Similarly, according to judicial statements of corporate law’s duty of loyalty, 
directors and officers must act fairly in matters involving their self-interest.189 The 
standard of conduct requires both that the terms of the transaction into which the 
corporation enters must be fair, and also that those terms were the result of a fair 
process.190 Where a disinterested Board of Directors has not approved the 
transaction in question, the judicial standard of review hews quite closely to the 
standard of conduct. But where a disinterested Board has approved the 
transaction, courts apply less searching standards of review, asking only, for 
example, whether disinterested directors could reasonably have believed that the 
transaction was fair.191 Eisenberg explains that this standard of review 
accommodates, on the one hand, ‘the need to make self-interested transactions 
reviewable for fairness’, and, on the other hand, ‘the value of institutional 
autonomy and the desirability of providing self-interested directors and officers 
with an incentive to seek early approval from disinterested directors’.192 
As constitutional law scholars have done, Eisenberg explicitly links his 
contrast between standards of conduct and standards of review in corporate law to 
Dan-Cohen’s conduct rule-decision rule distinction.193 Like Dan-Cohen, 
Eisenberg rejects the reductionist claim that the law consists solely of decision 
rules. He affirms the independent significance of standards of conduct in 
corporate law as messages to directors and officers about how they ought to 
discharge their functions.194 In a recent article building on Eisenberg’s insights, 
Julian Velasco follows Eisenberg in noting that, as a result of the divergence 
between standards of conduct and standards of review, corporate law’s standards 
of contract are only ‘imperfectly enforced’, or, using the very same word as 
constitutional law scholars, ‘underenforced’.195 Standards of review are sensibly 
more lenient than standards of conduct, so as to leave directors and officers some 
room for maneuver, and to leave courts some room for error.196 Velasco is 
particularly concerned to characterize corporate law’s standards of conduct as 
188 Id. at 443. 
189 Interestingly, Eisenberg concludes that corporate law’s narrow duty of good faith is not an 
underenforced norm. Id. at 449. It appears that, even as a standard of conduct, the duty of good faith in 
corporate law requires knowingly wrongful conduct. To put the point another way, corporate law’s duty 
of good faith is not a duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
190 Id. at 450. 
191 Id. at 453–54. 
192 Id. at 454. 
193 See supra, text to note 137. 
194 For criticism of this claim, and of the divergence thesis in corporate law more generally, see Robert J. 
Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1152 (2013). 
195 Velasco, supra note 25, at 580. 
196 Id. at 525 & 550–51. 
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genuine duties, against claims that, to the extent they go beyond judicial standards 
of review, corporate law’s standards of conduct are merely aspirational. For 
Velasco, as for Eisenberg, it still makes sense to speak of a legal duty in the 
absence of a sanction. Corporate law’s functions include providing guidance for 
those directors who wish to obey the law, regardless of whether they will face 
liability for violating their duties.  
The structure of this claim is similar to the constitutional decision rules 
scholars’ understanding of equal protection doctrine. Indeed, scholars of corporate 
law might fruitfully pursue the analogy between the underenforcement of 
directors’ and officers’ duties and underenforced constitutional norms. I will note 
just a couple of significant parallels. As in constitutional law, the existence of some 
alternative enforcement mechanism for inducing compliance with the conduct rule 
helps to build a case for the wisdom of underenforcement by courts. In corporate 
law, the relevant alternative mechanisms are provided mainly by corporate 
governance structures. Corporate officers are accountable to the Board of 
Directors; the Board, in turn, is mainly accountable to shareholders through means 
other than litigation. In the event of conduct that falls short of reasonable care or 
fairness in the conduct of self-interested transactions, shareholders can seek a 
more active role in corporate decision-making (the mechanism of ‘voice’) or sell 
their stock (the mechanism of ‘exit’).197 These governance mechanisms will 
generally be more effective than litigation, and at lower cost. But, of course, 
corporate governance mechanisms are far from perfect, and corporate law does 
not completely forswear judicial enforcement of directors’ duties. Its standards of 
review may perhaps be too deferential, but the courts are not entirely toothless. At 
the very least, courts maintain a useful role in identifying, and applying legal 
sanctions to, the worst breaches of the duties of care and loyalty. In addition, the 
debate over whether the unenforced portions of corporate law duties are ‘merely 
aspirational’ is paralleled by a debate in constitutional law over whether some of 
the Constitution’s most demanding norms should be viewed as partly 
aspirational.198 
 
 
 
 
197 The terminology of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ derives from ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND 
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). Hirschman focused 
more on responses by customers to decline in firms, but his typology has often been applied to corporate 
law. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV and Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation Shareholder Bylaws: Post-Quickturn 
Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323 (2001). 
198 Richard Fallon suggests that some constitutional rights should be viewed as partly aspirational from 
the point of view of any actor. See Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards, supra note 23, at 1324–27; but see 
Roosevelt, supra note 162 (expressing discomfort with this aspect of Fallon’s argument). 
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III. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AS AN UNDERENFORCED 
LEGAL NORM 
 
In this Part, I pursue the analogy between the constitutional law of equal 
protection, corporate law’s duties of care and loyalty, and the contracts norm of 
good faith and fair dealing. By this stage, certain elements of the analogy should be 
fairly obvious. All of these norms are stated at a high level of generality, and all are 
subject to contestation about their very meaning and their proper application to 
the facts of individual cases. As a result, many commentators and judges have 
voiced doubts about the institutional capacity of courts to handle such broad 
norms. Crucially, in all three areas, the courts have declined to enforce these 
norms to their fullest extent. Moreover, underenforcement may be justified in 
each case because of the availability of alternative institutions for giving effect to 
the norm. In the law of equal protection, the most common alternative 
mechanism for defining and enforcing a norm is the political process. In corporate 
law, shareholder activism and markets provide other ways of inducing compliance 
with legal duties. In contracts, as I will explain below, the most obvious alternative 
mechanisms to give effect to good faith and fair dealing are self-help measures and 
reputational sanctions. But, as in constitutional and corporate law, the existence of 
alternative mechanisms has not meant that the courts simply refrain from giving 
any effect to the norm of good faith and fair dealing. In all three areas, the courts 
have attempted to devise judicially manageable standards, and, moreover, have 
often reached for doctrinal solutions focusing on the defendant’s motivations. 
 
A. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING: THE CONDUCT RULE 
 
I propose that we take the rhetoric of good faith and fair dealing seriously — as a 
statement of the conduct rule that binds the parties. To that extent, the law of 
most states adopts Llewellyn’s vision of a legal norm requiring commercial 
reasonableness; in the words of the Restatement, good faith and fair dealing 
demands compliance with ‘community standards of decency, fairness or 
reasonableness’.199 As a conduct norm, good faith and fair dealing is akin to the 
norm of equal protection — it is an abstract principle of fairness in contract 
performance and enforcement. Just as the equal protection norm prevents 
government actors from classifying people unfairly, so the basic conduct norm of 
good faith and fair dealing prohibits unreasonable exercises of contractual 
discretion.200  
199 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981). 
200 Conceivably, good faith and fair dealing really stands for two norms: a norm of honesty and a norm of 
reasonableness. See Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery, 47 HASTINGS 
L.J. 585, 600–01 (1996). At a higher level of abstraction, however, the honesty norm can be folded into 
the reasonableness norm: reasonableness requires honesty.  
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Reasonableness in contract performance frequently extends beyond what the 
contract’s written terms seem to permit or require. Moreover, reasonableness 
demands more of contracting parties than avoiding spiteful behavior and 
borderline dishonesty. In the words of a business person interviewed by Stewart 
Macaulay for his famed study of contractual behavior: ‘[y]ou don’t read legalistic 
contract clauses at each other if you ever want to do business. One doesn’t run to 
others if he wants to stay in business because one must behave decently’.201 
Reasonableness in contractual conduct very often requires the parties to share 
losses and benefits unforeseen at the time of the initial contract. Particularly in 
contracts of longer duration, the parties are bound by social norms of 
reasonableness to adjust the terms of exchange to meet with new circumstances.202 
Ian Macneil’s work on relational contract theory similarly identifies norms of 
contractual solidarity, reciprocity, co-operation, and flexibility in the performance 
of contracts.203 While Macneil’s work is associated with an ex post perspective, 
broadly similar understandings of what reasonableness in contractual behavior 
involves have been derived from an ex ante perspective. Robert Scott, for example, 
defends a general norm of mutual cooperation in relational contracts, contending 
that rationally self-interested actors seek to share risks by agreeing, explicitly or 
implicitly, to cooperate with their contractual counterparties when new 
contingencies arise.204  
The conduct rule of good faith and fair dealing in contract performance is 
certainly open-ended. It is, however, a mistake to leap from the truism that good 
faith and fair dealing is vague to the claim that it ‘has no general meaning or 
meanings of its own’.205 As the editors of Corbin on Contracts explain, ‘[g]ood faith 
is a vague and shifting concept, but so is justice. That a concept cannot be 
formalized into a tight matrix does not make it wrong’.206 For more specific 
guidance as to what counts as reasonable behavior in particular case of class of 
cases, we might look to the particular social norms actually prevailing in a given 
industry.207 These prevailing norms provide significant, though non-conclusive, 
201 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61 
(1963). 
202 See Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis under Modern Contract Law, 
1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 6-7 (1987). 
203 See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL 
RELATIONS 1– 35 (1980); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 341, 
346–66 (1983). 
204 Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 
(1990) [hereinafter Scott, Relational Theory of Default Rules]. As I note below, Scott’s approach differs from 
mine in that he considers the implied norm of mutual cooperation to be non-legal. 
205 Summers, supra note 40, at 196. See Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good 
Faith Performance and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 349 (1988) (criticizing 
Summers’ ‘excluder’ analysis on the ground that ‘fails to separate the need for clarification of a fuzzy 
concept from concepts that are totally parasitic on other notions’). 
206 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 26.8. 
207 For a powerful attack on the idea that one can discern the content of good faith performance from 
prevailing practices, see Alan D. Miller & Ronan Perry, Good Faith Performance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 689 
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evidence of what counts as good faith and fair dealing.208 The task of discerning 
the demands of reasonableness in particular circumstances is admittedly a 
challenging one for an outsider to undertake. 
 
B. UNDERENFORCEMENT, THE LIMITATIONS OF COURTS, AND 
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT 
 
The courts have spared themselves the task of articulating a fully specified account 
of good faith and fair dealing. As the discussion in Part I.B makes clear, the courts 
do not even try to enforce the norm of good faith and fair dealing to its 
conceptual limits — whatever the norm’s precise meaning may be. Judicial 
practice makes clear is that good faith and fair dealing ‘is not an enforceable legal 
duty’ to behave in accordance with commercial decency towards one’s contractual 
counterparty.209 Many scholars have seen this divergence between rhetoric and 
reality as a simple form of hypocrisy. With analogous examples from constitutional 
and corporate law in mind, it should be easier to see now that pro-defendant 
judicial decisions do not necessarily mean that good faith and fair dealing is not 
valid as a conduct rule to its fullest extent.  
Just as courts lack the necessary legitimacy and expertise to discern the 
precise metes and bounds of equal protection and of duties in corporate law, so do 
they labor under analogous limitations when it comes to discerning fair exercises 
of contractual discretion. As neoformalist contracts scholars have stressed, it is 
both challenging and expensive for courts to figure out what counts as fair 
behavior between contracting parties. The point is not that the courts are 
completely unable to give content to vague standards. Indeed, the idea of good 
faith and fair dealing is no more uncertain than many of the legal standards that 
judges and juries are required  to apply. The tort of negligence, for example, often 
requires courts to determine what a reasonable person would have done in the 
circumstances, and eliminates or reduces a damage award when the plaintiff’s own 
unreasonable conduct contributed to her injury.  
The question, rather, is one of relative competence. As in the constitutional 
law of equal protection, where most claims of classificatory unfairness are left by 
the courts to the political branches, it is the existence of alternative, often superior 
ways of dealing with unreasonable exercises of contractual discretion that makes 
underenforcement of the good faith norm a plausible strategy. Unreasonable 
behavior by contracting parties is usually checked by self-help by the victim, who 
may refuse to deal with the other party in future, and by reputational sanctions.210 
(2013). Courts do not seem to have leaned heavily on specific trade usages when adjudicating good faith 
cases.  
208 See Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) 
(arguing that, at least early in his career, Llewellyn saw commercial norms as evidence of appropriate 
behavior, not as constituting the standard of proper behavior).  
209 Zick v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 623 F. Supp. 927, 929 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (emphasis added). 
210 See, e.g., David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990). 
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Compared with these mechanisms, litigation is both expensive and in more severe 
danger of error. Litigation requires lawyers and judges, who are not only paid for 
their time, but must also overcome informational deficits about the parties’ 
relationship before they can participate in adjudication of the dispute.  
On the other hand, when self-help and reputational sanctions break down — 
as they sometimes do when the parties’ relationship is at an end — litigation may 
come into its own in the limited class of cases where courts are fairly sure they can 
identify a misuse of contractual discretion. The underenforcement thesis thus fits 
with Eric Posner’s claim — meant to apply more generally to contract law — that 
‘a court, with its superior sanctions but inferior information, could do an adequate 
job of identifying extreme cases of opportunism but not minor cases of 
opportunism’.211  
Along these lines, one court has summed up its limited ambitions when 
developing good faith doctrine: ‘Without attempting to give positive content to 
the phrase ‘good faith,’ it is possible to set forth operational standards by which 
good faith can be distinguished from bad faith within a particular context.’212 
Much of the material in Part I.B of this article can fruitfully be understood in this 
way. Thus, a decision rule that requires plaintiffs to prove that the defendant acted 
from an improper motive does not exhaust the full scope of the requirement of 
good faith and fair dealing. But courts might sensibly choose a decision rule that 
limits liability to cases where the plaintiff can establish such an improper 
motive.213 Or courts might choose to review the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
decision under a deferential standard of review, reserving liability for truly arbitrary 
or unreasoned decisions. Again, they might impose a heightened burden of proof 
on plaintiffs to ease the burden on the courts and to channel the parties towards 
self-help and reputational sanctions. In crafting decision rules for good faith and 
fair dealing cases, courts have done all of these things and more. 
Though my claim that good faith and fair dealing is an underenforced legal 
norm is novel, it does not come entirely out of the blue. Clayton Gillette, whose 
article was among the earliest to identify the disparity between the rhetoric of 
good faith and its enforcement, hints at something like the underenforcement 
thesis when he says that, though ‘enforcement of an expansive notion of good 
faith appears to present overwhelming difficulties’,214 a more expansive good faith 
obligation might have a ‘precatory use’.215 But, by way of contrast to my views, 
Gillette characterizes compliance with a more expansive vision of good faith as ‘a 
supererogotary act’ rather than as a matter of duty. Moreover, Gillette adopts the 
211 ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 63 (2000). 
212 Best v. U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon, 739 P.2d 554, 558 (Or. 1987). 
213 See Henry E. Smith, The Equitable Dimension of Contract, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 897, 907 (2012) (‘Where 
someone is enforcing a right out of motivation to harm someone else, it is likely that something other 
than serving contractual purposes or welfare maximization is going on.’). 
214 Gillette, supra note 4, at 665.  
215 Id. at 664. 
 34 
                                                     
 
 
Paul MacMahon                                                                      Good Faith as Underenforced Norm  
 
assumption that legal duty depends for its existence on remedial enforcement by 
the courts,216 seemingly leaving no conceptual space for the enforcement gap 
between legal conduct rules and judicial decision rules. Again, somewhat similar 
ideas can also be found in the neoformalist scholarship of Robert Scott, who 
argues that the parties to relational contracts operate under two ‘sets of rules’: a 
literalistic set of rules for legal enforcement, and a more flexible set of rules for 
social enforcement.217 I agree with Scott that two sets of rules are at play. Scott, 
however, characterizes the more flexible set of rules as ‘extralegal norms’.218 My 
interpretation of good faith and fair dealing as an underenforced legal norm allows 
for the possibility of legally recognized relational norms, even if judges refrain 
from full enforcement of those norms. 
  
C. WHY ENGAGE IN DELIBERATE UNDERENFORCEMENT?  
 
Admittedly, it would be a fool’s errand to try to establish that good faith and fair 
dealing is at present an underenforced legal norm in every jurisdiction in the 
United States; the case law is much too varied to admit only of a single 
interpretation. I offer one possible way of understanding judicial practice, but it is 
not the only conceivable way of doing so. Why should we choose this 
understanding of the doctrine as a basis for its future development? Why, indeed, 
should legislatures or courts ever announce norms that they do not intend to be 
fully enforced? After all, in this context, and in others, there are some strong 
reasons against deliberately setting up a system of underenforcement. For one 
thing, disparities between conduct rules and decision rules can be misleading, or at 
least mentally taxing — it is difficult enough to keep one set of rules straight, 
without having to understand two. In corporate law, for example, some 
commentators have contended that divergences between conduct rules and 
enforcement rules are confusing, and have called for an alignment between 
standards of conduct and standards of review.219  
One deflationary way to think about underenforcement is to see it as a 
regrettable glitch in the law-making process: the result of a disagreement between 
different sources of law-making authority. In constitutional law, for example, one 
might say that underenforcement results from a judicial desire to depart from what 
the Constitution itself provides. If the judges could go back and rewrite the 
Constitution to bring its conduct rules into line with more sensible (level them 
down), they would. But judges cannot amend the Constitution — they are stuck 
with it. Underenforcement, on this view, is just the next best thing to leveling 
down. One could tell a similar story about good faith under the Uniform 
216 Id. at 620–21, 622–23. 
217 Scott, Relational Theory of Default Rules, supra note 204, at 615. 
218 Id. 
219 See Gregory Scott Crespi, Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law: The Need for Closer 
Alignment, 82 NEB. L. REV. 671 (2004) (‘[R]egardless of the particular criterion used, a single, clearly 
articulated standard is preferable to the current conflation of legal standards with moral exhortations.’). 
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Commercial Code. Having been handed what they consider an overexpansive 
understanding of the parties’ conduct rules but being unable to rewrite the Code 
themselves — this story might go — judges have effectively amended the good 
faith provision by engaging in underenforcement.  
The story, however, must be different at least when a given field is governed 
purely by common law. In common-law fields, courts generally could align their 
conduct rules and decision rules if they wished. If courts are unconstrained by 
another source of binding authority (constitutional or statutory), why would they 
want to say they are adopting a norm, yet leave it partially unenforced? The general 
doctrine of good faith and fair dealing thus provides a particularly pure testing 
ground for ideas about the justifiability of underenforcement. In turn, if a case can 
be made for deliberate underenforcement in the absence of split authority, that 
case may also apply to cases where authority is in fact divided. 
One possible line of reasoning for deliberately choosing the path of 
underenforcement in good faith and fair dealing might be based on Dan-Cohen’s 
idea of acoustic separation.220 According to Dan-Cohen, a legal system might 
sometimes be justified in announcing its (more demanding) conduct rules to the 
public, while obscuring its (less demanding) decision rules from public view. By 
engaging in selective transmission of its norms, the law can gain maximal 
compliance with its directives, while sometimes avoiding the negative 
consequences of punishment. Selective transmission relies for its effectiveness on 
some degree of deception; for some critics, that is enough reason to reject it 
outright.221 And whatever its merits in criminal law, where Dan-Cohen suggested 
it might be justified, selective transmission seems a particularly dubious 
proposition in private law.222 One extra difficulty with engaging in this form of 
deception in private law is that private law relations are bilateral. It is one thing to 
mislead the subject of a criminal law duty into thinking she will face sanctions, 
only to show mercy in the event of an actual violation. But it is quite another thing 
to mislead the beneficiary of a duty into believing she has an enforceable claim, only 
to pull the rug out from underneath her after she suffers a breach. Moreover, in 
many private law areas, selective transmission is difficult to achieve. In corporate 
law, for example, it is surely impossible to hide decision rules from directors and 
officers.223 Worse still, because corporate insiders are especially likely to know 
what really happens when disputes get to court, the attempt to engage in selective 
transmission of legal norms may create an added source of shareholder ignorance 
for insiders to exploit. Similarly, selective transmission is unlikely to be effective in 
220 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 21. 
221 Richard Singer, On Classism and Dissonance in the Criminal Law: A Reply to Professor Meir Dan-Cohen, 77 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 69, 84–100 (1986). 
222 But see Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. 
REV. 551, 634–35 nn. 339–42 (1999) (approvingly applying Dan-Cohen’s acoustic separation idea to wills 
law). 
223 See Velasco, supra note 25, at 541–44 (rejecting acoustic separation in corporate law context on 
normative and descriptive grounds). 
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good faith and fair dealing cases. If anything, uncommunicated divergences 
between conduct rules and decision rules in good faith and fair dealing are likely to 
provide an unfair advantage to repeat players — franchisors, for example — 
whose discretion the good faith and fair dealing norm is aimed at constraining.224 
So when courts design and apply decision rules that diverge from conduct 
rules, at least in field of good faith and fair dealing, they should generally do so 
openly. But candor in underenforcement does not necessarily mean that the 
unenforced portions of conduct rules will be ineffective. To view the effect of law 
solely in terms of its enforcement is to miss a great deal.225 The law affects 
people’s behavior by providing them with standards of behavior for use in their 
practical reasoning.226 People obey legal standards in part because they are the law. 
In addition, people follow legal standards in part because they fear they will suffer 
reputational sanctions when others learn that they have broken the law. Neither of 
these mechanisms for affecting behavior is vitiated by the absence of a perfectly 
corresponding decision rule. Moreover, private law’s guidance function is best 
achieved through relatively simple, easy-to-understand rules.227 Though open-
ended, the courts’ general statements about the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
are much easier to digest than the patchwork of decision rules they have 
developed for adjudication. 
Having gloried in private law’s guidance function for the last couple of 
paragraphs, I should inject an appropriate note of skepticism about it in the 
specific case of good faith and fair dealing. In truth, it is far from clear how much 
the unenforced portion of the duty might make a direct difference to the behavior 
of actual contracting parties. Empirical studies suggest that even the enforceable 
parts of contract law play only a minor role in commercial dealings,228 giving 
special reason to doubt the idea that, to the extent they are unenforced, judicial 
and legislative exhortations to act fairly have a great deal of effect. As I have 
suggested, the underenforced portion of the good faith and fair dealing norm is 
enforced by nonjudicial sanctions. But the requirement that one treat one’s 
contractual counterparty reasonably would be a social norm even without the law’s 
intervention. The law’s symbolic support for the social norm may makes a 
marginal difference — but is that marginal difference enough to justify the 
potential confusion caused by an enforcement gap? 
Perhaps not. But, in the case of good faith and fair dealing and elsewhere, 
there is an additional reason to announce a broad, partly underenforced conduct 
rule: to influence judicial behavior. This may appear a paradoxical thought. 
224 See Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & 
SOC. REV. 95 (1974). 
225 John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1656 (2012) 
(‘[T]he law’s authority resides as much in its ability to articulate recognizable norms of conduct as in the 
state’s enforcement power.’). 
226 For an illuminating discussion of the law’s guidance function, with a private law focus, see Dale A. 
Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837 (1997). 
227 See Eisenberg, Divergence, supra note 24, at 465. 
228 Macaulay, supra note 201.  
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Conduct rules, after all, are directed at citizens; decision rules are directed at 
courts. But, when formulating decision rules, judges are supposed to take much of 
their inspiration from the conduct rule they seek to implement. The duty of good 
faith and fair dealing sets a baseline of reasonable behavior,229 even if it only finds 
partial expression in judicial decision rules. It reminds judges that contracting is 
not supposed to be a game of poker, and that their role — though constrained by 
pragmatic limitations — is to support healthier norms than those envisaged by a 
literal approach to contractual behavior. In turn, a broad conduct rule can be used 
to put parties on notice that they risk liability if they act in an opportunistic or 
excessively self-regarding manner.230 Courts should thus not be too concerned 
about occasionally expanding decision rules to bring them closer to the conduct 
rule’s demands, even with retroactive effect on the defendant before the court. 
Such a policy would help induce defendants at least to think twice before aiming 
to place their conduct in the gap between the law’s conduct rules and its decision 
rules.231 
 
D. AN OBJECTION: THE MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIVERGENCES 
 
At this point, scholars versed in recent debates over contract law’s moral 
foundations may sense a potential roadblock. The idea of underenforced legal 
norms in contract law might be thought vulnerable to the arguments in Seana 
Shiffrin’s intricate and thought-provoking critique of the law of contract as it 
currently stands.232 While Shiffrin rejects the simple idea that the law should aim 
to enforce interpersonal morality as such, she makes the plausible claim that the 
law should be compatible with the conditions necessary for moral agency to 
flourish.233 From this perspective, Shiffrin contends that divergences between 
promissory morality and the law of contract — particularly the weakness of 
remedies available for breach of contract — may contribute to a culture of 
wrongful promise-breaking. While Shiffrin does not mention the doctrine of good 
faith and fair dealing, we might surmise that its underenforcement would draw her 
ire.234 As a matter of promissory morality, the arguments for a robust norm of 
229 See Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Property 
in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911 (1989). 
230 See Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity (March 10, 2010), available at 
www.ssrn.com. Smith contends that preventing opportunism is a unifying function for equitable 
doctrines. Though the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing grew up after the fusion of law and equity, 
it has strong equitable overtones.   
231 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1214 (2010); Kennedy, supra note 68, at 1773–74. 
232 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007) 
[hereinafter Shiffrin, Divergence]. 
233 Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 232, at 790. 
234 Indeed, one of Shiffrin’s critics, Steven Feldman, cites the existence of the doctrine of good faith and 
fair dealing as part of his argument against the existence of a divergence between contract law and 
promissory morality. Feldman claims that good faith and fair dealing is a ‘wide-ranging code of moral 
conduct that spans the full spectrum of formation, performance, and enforcement’. Steven W. Feldman, 
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good faith and fair dealing seem firm. To the extent that the underenforcement 
thesis suggests permissible caution about the legalization of that norm, the law 
seems to diverge from promissory morality.  
Contra Shiffrin, however, the best way to support and maintain good moral 
character in contractual situations may often be to allow divergences to open up 
between promissory morality and the law of contract, or at least between 
promissory morality and judicial decision rules in the law of contract. If courts 
were to attempt to occupy the full moral field, they might do more harm than 
good. Again, the analogy to constitutional law helps to make the point more vivid. 
There, the underenforcement thesis helps to make clear that an action can violate 
the Constitution even though no court will provide a remedy for the violation, 
allowing space for legislators and citizens to make their own constitutional 
judgments. James Bradley Thayer famously relied on the value of such 
independent judgments when arguing that courts should apply a ‘clear error’ test 
when reviewing the constitutionality of legislation.235 Thayer contended that, if the 
courts seek to occupy the field, the political branches of government will tend to 
abdicate their own responsibility for interpreting the Constitution, leading to 
unfortunate setbacks to constitutional values.236 Similarly, a body of judicial 
enforcement practices that tried to enforce promissory morality would risk 
‘crowding out’ the operation of trust and social norms by means of excessive 
juridification.237 The courts’ inevitably clumsy attempts to enforce the morality of 
good faith in full might backfire on moral as well as economic grounds, hindering 
people’s ability to develop valuable relationships of interpersonal trust.238  
But Shiffrin’s underlying premises, particularly when combined with Thayer’s 
argument, do reinforce my earlier conclusion that courts should be open and clear 
that their decisions to impose liability for good faith and fair dealing do not 
occupy the full field. Candor in underenforcement should go some of the way to 
addressing Shiffrin’s concerns, for it helps to avoid the implication that a decision 
to reject the plaintiff’s claim for institutional reasons necessarily entails approval of 
the defendant’s conduct.239 Hence, when dismissing claims, courts should be 
Autonomy and Accountability in the Law of Contract: A Response to Professor Shiffrin, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 177, 196 
(2009). Feldman’s descriptive claim is not terribly far off being an accurate depiction of the rhetoric of 
good faith and fair dealing, but — as Part I.B shows — it does not match the reality of enforcement. 
235 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 
155–56 (1893). 
236 Id. at 155–56. 
237 On juridification generally, see Gunther Teubner, Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in 
JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, 
ANTITRUST, AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW (G. Teubner ed., 1987).  
238 For intricate discussion of some analogous issues in contract law, see DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO 
CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT ch. 1–3 (2003); Aditi Bagchi, Separating Contract 
and Promise, 38 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 709 (2011). For a more economic rendering of similar ideas, see, for 
example, Charny, supra note 210. 
239 I say ‘some of the way’, because even if courts try to make clear that they are engaging in 
underenforcement, observers might draw the wrong impression from the court’s decision to reject a 
claim of good faith and fair dealing. For stimulating discussion of some analogous problems in the law, 
see Bert I. Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2229, 2229 (2013) (‘Whenever the law quietly 
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cautious about stating that a particular party’s conduct was in good faith and 
complied with reasonable standards of fair dealing. In closer cases, courts should 
take pains to say instead that the plaintiff failed to establish the requirements of 
decision rules.  
To some extent, judicial opinions already do something similar. Take, as an 
example, the First Circuit’s decision in a case from a few months ago, Young v. 
Wells Fargo Bank.240 The court was asked by a mortgage debtor to apply the 
Massachusetts law of good faith and fair dealing to a creditor’s conduct. The court 
rejected the claim because the complaint failed to satisfy the doctrinal rubric laid 
down by Massachusetts courts: it did not establish that the bank had acted with an 
improper purpose. Nevertheless, the First Circuit’s opinion stated that the bank’s 
‘dilatory and careless conduct [was] troubling’, found it ‘problematic’ that the bank 
had refused to give the debtor clear answers about the parties’ relative legal 
obligations until she hired a lawyer, and noted that complaint painted a picture of 
an ‘unthinking and sloppy’ institution.241 None of these remarks was strictly 
necessary for the court’s decision to dismiss the good faith and fair dealing claim. 
But they do help to make clear that the enforcement of good faith falls short of 
what the conduct rule requires. 
 
 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
 
The underenforcement thesis both illuminates existing judicial practice and points 
the way to a more coherent approach to good faith and fair dealing in the future. 
In this Part, I explore four ways that viewing good faith and fair dealing as an 
underenforced norm would be helpful to courts and scholars. 
 
A. LEVELS OF SCRUTINY IN GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
 
Perhaps the most useful analogy between equal protection and good faith is that 
the degree of underenforcement of these norms rightly varies with context. There 
is no a priori reason why the choice of decision rule should be made at the 
wholesale level. In different contexts, the relative strengths of judicial enforcement 
and alternative mechanisms for inducing compliance with good faith and fair 
dealing will wax and wane. Accordingly, it probably makes sense for scholars and 
courts to develop differing levels of scrutiny for good faith and fair dealing claims. 
A single doctrinal test has the merit of simplicity, but a one-size-fits-all approach is 
unlikely to be optimal. 
permits some actors to act in a way that is usually forbidden, copycat misconduct may be erroneously 
inspired by the false appearance that ‘others are doing it too.’’).  
240 Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224 (1st Cir. 2013). 
241 Id. at 238–39. 
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This line of thought suggests two questions for scholars of good faith: first, 
what classes of cases are ripe for heightened scrutiny, in the way that race and 
gender-based classifications are singled out for special treatment among equal 
protection claims? And, second, what sort of heightened scrutiny should courts 
give to claims singled out in this way? Existing doctrine shows some signs of 
contextual differentiation, but it is difficult to see a coherent pattern.242 Most 
exercises of contractual discretion get fairly light scrutiny, akin to rational basis 
review. Usually, if a defendant so much as offers a legitimate reason for her 
decision, she will escape liability.243  
But sometimes courts in good faith cases apply doctrinal tests with real teeth. 
For example, some state-law franchise statutes, courts apply a pro-plaintiff 
doctrine test in which the burden falls on the franchisor to explain and justify the 
decision.244 The structural inequalities that characterize many franchise 
relationships may well justify a more searching judicial role, because alternative 
mechanisms for controlling franchisor discretion are less likely to be effective than 
in cases involving two roughly equal commercial parties. Another class of claims 
that might deserve — and may even be getting — heightened scrutiny are claims 
against subprime consumer mortgage creditors.245 On the other hand, the courts 
of Delaware have been especially reluctant to augment the text of the contract in 
cases involving preferred stock contracts.246 
 
B. TOTAL EXCLUSION OF GOOD FAITH V. LIMITED DECISION RULE 
 
The idea of good faith and fair dealing as an underenforced legal norm can also 
help to illuminate the choice between, on one hand, refusing to enforce good faith 
entirely and, on the other hand, giving some limited effect to the norm via a 
decision rule. Courts often face an analogous question in constitutional law: faced 
with institutional reasons counseling against judicial enforcement of a particular 
norm in a given context, should they decline to operate in that field entirely 
(pursuant to the political question doctrine)? Or should they design a test that 
gives some effect to the constitutional norm? Richard Fallon argues persuasively 
that the burden of persuasion should fall on those who advocate complete judicial 
242 For example, the near-total absence of scrutiny of employment terminations is difficult to understand 
in these terms. If anything, such decisions seem particularly worthy of heightened scrutiny.   
243 On the other hand, if the defendant offers no reason at all for her exercise of discretion, she may well 
find herself liable. See Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988). 
244 See American Mart Corp. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 824 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir. 1987). This test 
certainly falls short of the constitutional law test for strict scrutiny; I have found no court requiring a 
defendant in a good faith case to establish a compelling interest for her exercise of discretion.  
245 See Leonhard, supra note 133; see also Joseph William Singer, Subprime: Why a Free and Democratic Society 
Needs Law, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 141 (2012).  
246 See D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Interpretation of Venture Capital 
Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825, 851–52 (2004) (‘While no one seriously advocates a strict 
application of the ‘plain meaning’ approach to contract interpretation in all cases, the Delaware courts 
have adhered fairly consistently to such a standard in cases involving the interpretation of preferred stock 
terms.’). 
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abstention as opposed to the development of some sort of manageable 
standard.247  
Certainly, total exclusion of the implied norm of good faith and fair dealing 
might well be justified in the right circumstances. The law of interstate compacts 
provides a potential illustration, at an interesting intersection between public law 
and private law. Agreements between and among the States must be approved by 
Congress,248 and disputes arising from them come before the Supreme Court 
under its original jurisdiction. The Court treats interstate compacts as contracts, 
and generally interprets them in line with general principles of contract 
interpretation. Nevertheless, in 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that states are not 
subject to implied duties of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of an 
interstate compact.249 The court ruled that North Carolina’s explicitly stated power 
to withdraw from the compact could not be subjected to review for its fairness in 
the way that a private party’s exercise of discretion might. In explaining this 
decision for the Court, Justice Scalia stressed institutional factors: federalism and 
separation-of-powers concerns counseled against a rule that would permit the 
Supreme Court to supplement the express terms agreed by political branches of 
state and federal governments. Moreover, the context in which interstate compacts 
are drafted and ratified suggests that these compacts are more likely than ordinary 
contracts to be considered complete at the time of drafting.250 
But in other areas, such as at-will employment, some courts seem to have 
moved too soon to the conclusion that good faith and fair dealing has no role to 
play. More generally, when one considers the wide range of potential decision 
rules from which courts can choose in implementing the good faith and fair 
dealing norm, the neoformalist critique of the general duty of good faith seems to 
be an overreaction. While Bernstein, Scott, and others may have been right to 
criticize Llewellyn’s attempts to incorporate commercial morality in its entirety 
into commercial law, the neoformalist critique has considerably less bite against a 
doctrine of good faith that is underenforced via the operation of constrained, 
judicially manageable standards.251 
 
247 Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards, supra note 146, at 1306–09 (‘Viewed along a spectrum, a 
determination of nonjusticiability due to the absence of judicially manageable standards is simply the 
limiting case of a decision to underenforce constitutional norms.’).  
248 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. 
249 Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330 (2010). 
250 As Justice Scalia noted, the drafters of several interstate compacts for the disposal of radioactive waste 
have explicitly chosen to incorporate duties of good faith into those agreements. Alabama v. North 
Carolina, 560 U.S. at __ (citing Central Interstate Low–Level Radioactive Waste Compact, Art. III(f), 99 
Stat. 1865; Central Midwest Interstate Low–Level Radioactive Waste Compact, Art. V(a), id., at 1886; 
Midwest Interstate Low–Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact, Art. V(a), id., at 1897). 
251 Stewart Macaulay makes a similar point when responding to Bernstein’s work. If, as Bernstein 
suggests, there are often reasons to doubt the existence of trade usages, why isn’t it sufficient to meet this 
concern to craft a decision rule whereby the party seeking to rely on a trade usage bears the burden of 
establishing it? Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts about the Ideas of Ian 
Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 788 (2000). 
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C. SHOULD THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BE 
EXCLUDABLE?  
 
Distinguishing between good faith and fair dealing as a conduct rule and good 
faith as a set of judicial decision rules also sheds some light on a doctrinal 
conundrum: should parties be able to contract out of the norm of good faith and 
fair dealing? Existing law suggests that the obligation of good faith is not just a 
default rule, but an immutable rule.252 The general duty of good faith under the 
U.C.C. cannot be disclaimed by agreement.253 Admittedly, the Code quickly 
qualifies the immutability of good faith, noting that parties can define the 
standards for judging good faith, so long as their chosen standards are not 
‘manifestly unreasonable’.254 Similarly, though there is little case law on whether 
parties can contract around the general common law duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, some courts have said that attempts to do so will be ineffective.255 In the 
words of the New York Court of Appeals, ‘[n]o covenant of immunity can be 
drawn that will protect a person who acts in bad faith, because […] the courts will 
not enforce it’.256  
Supporting the immutability of good faith, some writers have claimed that it 
must be either self-contradictory257 or fraudulent258 to enter into a contract while 
denying one’s obligation to perform in good faith. But these arguments become 
substantially less powerful when one allows for the possibility of a divergence 
between conduct rules and decision rules. It need not be self-contradictory or 
fraudulent — in fact, given the limitations of litigation, it may be very sensible — 
for a party to wish to exclude judicial enforcement of good faith and fair dealing. 
Thus, there seems to be little reason why commercial parties should not be able to 
exclude the operation of a good-faith-based judicial decision rule by means of an 
explicit contractual provision. In this respect, the U.C.C.’s rule that the duty of 
good faith is partially immutable is somewhat difficult to justify. On the other 
hand, for familiar reasons, the courts should often be suspicious of attempts to 
exclude the duty of good faith and fair dealing by clickwrap and other standard-
form consumer contracts, and should limit the duty’s displacement to genuine 
cases of agreed exclusion.  
 
 
 
252 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 
99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (noting that ‘under the Uniform Commercial Code […] the duty to act in good 
faith is an immutable part of any contract’). 
253 U.C.C. § 1-102(3). 
254 Id. 
255 See STEPHEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH 72–74 (1995). 
256 Indus. & Gen. Trust v. Tod, 73 N.E. 7, 9 (1905).  
257 Markovits, supra note 27. 
258 BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 255, at 74. 
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D. ARBITRATION DECISIONS ON GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
 
In constitutional law, the underenforcement literature suggests that political actors 
lacking the institutional limitations of courts should take a more expansive view of 
constitutional rights and duties. Applying this insight to contract law, comparative 
institutional considerations suggest that arbitrators are in a position to impose 
more demanding duties of good faith and fair dealing. More than courts, which 
tend to be staffed by generalist judges and juries who lack expertise, arbitrators are 
often in a better position to identify unreasonable contractual behavior, and at a 
lower cost.259 Other things being equal, the case for gaps between conduct rules 
and decision rules is lessened, and such gaps should be smaller. 
Though the available evidence is equivocal,260 the application of the good 
faith norm in collective bargaining does seem to provide one example of 
arbitrators giving fuller effect to the good faith norm than their judicial 
counterparts. As we have seen, the majority of American states refuse to apply the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment termination cases. 
But labor arbitrators adjudicating collective bargaining disputes have been willing 
to give serious force to the covenant.261 The covenant is well established as a 
matter of arbitral jurisprudence, and has, for example, been applied to disputes 
over employers’ decisions to sub-contract work in arguable violation of the spirit 
of a labor agreement. In the absence of a contrary contractual provision, 
management must demonstrate that its decision to sub-contract — and thus to 
avoid the collective bargaining agreement’s employment provisions — was ‘made 
in good faith and is objectively reasonable’.262 In labor arbitration, the covenant of 
good faith and fair doling ‘serves as the basis for the proposition that management 
discretion must be exercised reasonably’.263 The degree of underenforcement is 
further reduced by decisions that place the burden of satisfying this doctrinal test 
on the management.264 
Perhaps this greater arbitral willingness to enforce the covenant of good faith 
against employers is just a result of the dynamics of labor negotiations, but my 
analysis suggests other reasons why it might make sense. Labor arbitrators have a 
greater degree of expertise in the subject of labor disputes, and are presumably less 
259 See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5–6 (1995) 
(arbitrators may be in a better position than courts to detect substandard contractual performance). 
260 As against the example in the text, Lisa Bernstein contends that many industry-specific private 
arbitration bodies apply a ‘formalistic’ approach, seemingly hostile to enforcement of a good faith norm. 
See supra note 116.  
261 Brudney, supra note 112, at 806–07. 
262 See In re Libbey Glass, 116 Lab. Arb. 182, 186-87 (2000) (Ruben, Arb.) (finding no violation of the 
covenant in employer’s decision to sub-contract because of cost considerations).  
263 In re Sierra Chem. Co., 121 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1593 (2005) (Pool, Arb.) (finding a violation of the 
covenant resulting from employer’s failure to consider relevant evidence during an employee grievance 
proceeding).  
264 See Libbey Glass, supra note 262, at 187; see also In re United Technologies Automotive, 108 Lab. Arb. 
769, 772 (1997) (Richard, Arb.). 
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prone to the kinds of errors made by generalist courts, which are more likely to fail 
to understand the parties’ employment relationship. Moreover, these 
considerations have obvious implications for judicial review of arbitration 
decisions. Of course, courts already have general reasons to defer to the decisions 
of arbitrators — but those reasons are particularly strong in the good faith and fair 
dealing field. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
My purpose in this article has been to establish that good faith and fair dealing can 
helpfully be understood as an underenforced legal norm. But the status of 
underenforced legal norms is — to use a word from the constitutional law 
literature — a larger metadoctrinal issue.265 The phenomenon of 
underenforcement appears to exist elsewhere in private law. Most fundamentally, 
the idea of an enforcement gap between legal duties and available sanctions helps 
to make sense of how the courts talk about remedies in contracts, torts, and 
property cases. In particular, the notion of underenforced legal norms provides a 
line of response to Holmes’s aphorism that there is no duty at common law to 
keep one’s contracts — only a duty to pay damages.266 Once we have abandoned 
the assumption that being vulnerable to judicial sanction is the essence of legal 
duty, we can see why courts speak of legal duties to keep contracts even where 
specific performance is not available, and of rights to exclude others from 
property even where a court will not award an injunction. 
It is no coincidence that constitutional law scholarship helps the analysis.267 
For various reasons, similar metadoctrinal questions in have received more 
attention from scholars in constitutional law in recent years than have analogous 
questions in private law. For some time, much interesting and original work in 
private law eschewed the internal perspective on doctrine, preferring to assess 
contracts, torts, property, and so on through the lenses of other disciplines, 
especially economics. Without jettisoning the enormous insights to be gained from 
of interdisciplinary scholarship, I suggest that private law would benefit — and is 
benefiting268 — from a metadoctrinal turn of its own. By juxtaposing questions of 
265 Berman, supra note 141, at 4. 
266 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897). 
267 In the last few years, the trend has mostly been in the opposite direction; scholars have more often 
drawn ideas from private law into debates about public law. See, e.g., Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis 
and the Objective Theory of Contracts, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63 (1994) (drawing on the law of contracts 
to illuminate constitutional law); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999) (contending that private law insights as to the relationship between rights and 
remedies cast useful light on analogous questions in constitutional law); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as 
Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 677 (2013) (contending that politicians should be treated as fiduciaries, 
subject to a duty of loyalty). 
268 See Goldberg, Pragmatism and Private Law, supra note 225. 
 45 
                                                     
                         22/2014 
 
doctrinal design from constitutional law and private law, we can shed light on 
questions of comparative institutional analysis that cut across legal domains.269  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
269 See Neil Komesar, The Logic of the Law and the Essence of Economics: Reflections On Forty Years in the 
Wilderness, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 265 (2013).  
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